On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference
problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid
also about Everett QM,
Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,
That is not relevant for the point you made. Our motivation has
nothing to do with the fact that Quentin validly convince everybody
that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it
is valid on Everett too.
After that you did a valiant effort to save your pount y invoking the
fact that in classical duplication we can met, and that is not the
case ith QM, but that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI,
as others showed to you.
more particularly in the continuity of the sense of self, and that
has absolutely positively 100% nothing to do with predictions, not
good predictions and not bad predictions either. In fact the
continuity of self has nothing to do with the future at all, you
might not even have a future, all that matters is if you remember
being Bruno Marchal yesterday.
We agree on that, and this is why the distinction between 1p and 3p
used in this context suppress all ambiguities. But it still happen
that to verify our theories we make prediction, be it of an eclipse, a
spin of an electron, or the content of the diaries of people going out
reconstitution boxes, made in the physical realities, or in
computations.
So a theory, be it on matter and consciousness, and a fortiori for a
theory on the relation between consciousness and matter (or matter
appearances) has everything to do with prediction.
Everett still assume some universal waves, but with computationalism,
this cannot help, a machine cannot distinguish all the computable
rational approximations of the wave, with the wave itself, but then
the quantum wave can only works if it supplant all the other possible
computations, and that is what AUDA, or "the machine interview" (in
the Sane2004 paper) begins to compute.
Bruno
John K Clark
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