I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question "What do
you think about machines that think?":

http://edge.org/contributors/q2015

Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement:

"So let us hypothesize that qualia are internal properties of some brain
processes. When observed from the outside, those brain processes can be
described in terms of motions, potentials, masses, charges. But they have
additional internal properties, which sometimes include qualia. Qualia must
be extreme cases of being purely internal. More complex aspects of mind may
turn out to be combinations of relational and internal properties."

This formulation seems to be a version of panpsychism. Earlier in the
piece, Smolin states a commitment to 'naturalism', which I presume commits
him ultimately to grounding all explanation in the material (whatever that
may specifically entail). Within this framework, his hypothesis is that
there are internal properties of matter that are inaccessible to external
observation. Such internal properties must be involved, he says, in the
phenomenon of qualia (their 'extreme' form) and in addition they are
somehow implicated in other more 'complex' aspects of mind.

My question is this: is this position just obviously wrong? My reason for
asking it is that ISTM that Smolin and other proponents of this view seem
to entirely miss the glaring problem of reference. Smolin suggests that
"the more complex aspects of mind may turn out to be combinations of
relational and internal properties". But if this were indeed the case, how
are such relational (i.e. observable) properties (which, lest we forget ,
are supposed to constitute a closed causal system) supposed to refer to
(i.e. be lawfully or logically connected with) those that are 'internal'
(i.e. unobservable)? Is this supposed to be a merely adventitious
parallelism, on the lines of epiphenomenalism? If it were, it would leave
the mysteries untouched, in my view. ISTM that panpsychist notions such as
these founder hopelessly on this issue, even though it doesn't seem to be
generally recognised as their Achilles' heel.

Any thoughts?

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