I'm assuming it because he states it explicitly. He specifically distinguishes what can be "observed from the outside" from "additional internal properties". He specifically brackets qualia with the "extreme case " of the latter as paradigmatic examples of the unobservable. I suggest you read the whole piece if you're in any doubt as to his meaning but it seems perfectly clear to me.
Your point about the historical antecedents of this notion is interesting, but what about my question? How are external and internal properties supposed to be able to mutually refer? If a sensation (quale) of red is ultimately rooted in some unobservable internal property of matter, how can that property simultaneously contrive to be the referent of any presumably relational (external, observable) claim to that sensation? In other words, when Smolin says that he sees red he must suppose this to be, on his own avowed naturalism, an (observable) consequence of physical causality alone. How could further 'internal' properties be supposed to intervene in this account? David On 17 Jan 2015 21:32, "meekerdb" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 1/17/2015 9:25 AM, David Nyman wrote: > >> I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question "What >> do you think about machines that think?": >> >> http://edge.org/contributors/q2015 >> >> Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement: >> >> "So let us hypothesize that qualia are internal properties of some brain >> processes. When observed from the outside, those brain processes can be >> described in terms of motions, potentials, masses, charges. But they have >> additional internal properties, which sometimes include qualia. Qualia must >> be extreme cases of being purely internal. More complex aspects of mind may >> turn out to be combinations of relational and internal properties." >> >> This formulation seems to be a version of panpsychism. Earlier in the >> piece, Smolin states a commitment to 'naturalism', which I presume commits >> him ultimately to grounding all explanation in the material (whatever that >> may specifically entail). Within this framework, his hypothesis is that >> there are internal properties of matter that are inaccessible to external >> observation. Such internal properties must be involved, he says, in the >> phenomenon of qualia (their 'extreme' form) and in addition they are >> somehow implicated in other more 'complex' aspects of mind. >> >> My question is this: is this position just obviously wrong? My reason for >> asking it is that ISTM that Smolin and other proponents of this view seem >> to entirely miss the glaring problem of reference. Smolin suggests that >> "the more complex aspects of mind may turn out to be combinations of >> relational and internal properties". But if this were indeed the case, how >> are such relational (i.e. observable) properties (which, lest we forget , >> are supposed to constitute a closed causal system) supposed to refer to >> (i.e. be lawfully or logically connected with) those that are 'internal' >> (i.e. unobservable)? Is this supposed to be a merely adventitious >> parallelism, on the lines of epiphenomenalism? If it were, it would leave >> the mysteries untouched, in my view. ISTM that panpsychist notions such as >> these founder hopelessly on this issue, even though it doesn't seem to be >> generally recognised as their Achilles' heel. >> >> Any thoughts? >> >> > I don't know why you assume "internal" means "not observable"? Electric > charge is an internal property of an electron; its position is a relative > property. Right? But both are observable. > > I struck by how close Smolin's idea is the pre-socratic Greek ideas of > Anaximander and Democritus. They supposed that the soul (the animating > principle of life, qualia, etc.) was realized by special "soul atoms" that > interacted with other atoms but were extremely small and fine and so were > not detected when they leave the body. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
