On 1/17/2015 2:36 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I'm assuming it because he states it explicitly. He specifically distinguishes what can
be "observed from the outside" from "additional internal properties". He specifically
brackets qualia with the "extreme case " of the latter as paradigmatic examples of the
unobservable. I suggest you read the whole piece if you're in any doubt as to his
meaning but it seems perfectly clear to me.
Your point about the historical antecedents of this notion is interesting, but what
about my question? How are external and internal properties supposed to be able to
mutually refer? If a sensation (quale) of red is ultimately rooted in some unobservable
internal property of matter, how can that property simultaneously contrive to be the
referent of any presumably relational (external, observable) claim to that sensation? In
other words, when Smolin says that he sees red he must suppose this to be, on his own
avowed naturalism, an (observable) consequence of physical causality alone. How could
further 'internal' properties be supposed to intervene in this account?
I agree, with such a constraining definition of "internal" it would seem that no
interaction with the world or other people is possible. It would only be consistent with
a "brain in a vat, dreaming the world". But that's pretty close to Bruno's idea of a UD
world. The UD computes (or simulates) the dreaming and the dreamer infers the physical
world (including the existence of others) and there need only be one computed "dreamer" to
dream all the different dreams having different points of view.
Brent
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