On 1/19/2015 1:21 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com
<mailto:da...@davidnyman.com>> wrote:
But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
example claims, then it would be analytically true, not a contingent
fact.
I'd like to amplify here a little in light of my longer response to you
about comp
and the Hard Problem. Dennett's public and oft-repeated position is that
physics
has primacy over (for example) computation or logic. In other words, he
believes
that before something can be deemed computational or logical, it must first
be
physical. My point is that, given this prior commitment, he actually has no
basis
for any claim that zombies are *logically* impossible unless they are first
*physically* impossible.
?? Everything that exists must be physically possible is compatible with
everything
that exists must also be logically possible and most people think that
nomologically
possible is a subset of logically possible. So logically impossible implies
physically impossible. I think you're confused about Dennett.
I don't think you've taken my point. According to Dennett, at least as I've always read
him, everything that 'exists' must do so physically. This position (which is an
intrinsic part of what he calls his 'third-person absolutism') has led him to his
attempted wholesale substitution of 'judgements' about consciousness (which can be
cashed out physically) for the supposed 'illusion' of consciousness. On this basis,
nothing that is physically impossible could exist (obviously). Hence, to show that
zombies could not possibly exist Dennett would have to convince us a priori that they
couldn't possibly exist *physically* - i.e. that they violate some essential principle
of physical explanation.
An essential principle of a physical explanation (or any explanation) is that it not be
self-contradictory, i.e. logically possible. Hence logically impossible => physically
impossible; at least that's the usual sense. I don't assume that Dennett is right about
showing a zombie is logically impossible; I'm just saying that if he did it would also
show it was physically impossible. Maybe you're saying that logically impossible doesn't
imply physically impossible because logic depends are presuppositions and interpretations
of words which always have the possibility of being wrong - which is true, but are we
really asking for certainty?
My point is that this can't be done. There's nothing about physical explanation that
requires a conscious point of view
That's assuming that Dennett is wrong.
and consequently it doesn't harm a zombie's purely 'physical' status to deny that it has
one.
However, the fact is (as notoriously argued by Chalmers, for example) that
we have
precisely zero evidence that zombies are physically impossible. In point of
fact
they would appear to be physically *inevitable*, given that the system of
physical
relation appears (very convincingly) to be both causally sufficient and
causally
closed.
Being causally closed would be an argument against libertarian free-will,
but I
don't see why it's an argument against consciousness.
It's an argument against consciousness, as construed as something other than its
physical correlates, because nothing attributable to physical explanation would ever
lead us to believe a priori in the necessity of a conscious point of view to what we are
describing.
I think you are mixing standards here. The "necessity" you ask for seems to be logical
necessity, which indeed will not be forthcoming from the physics. But that's the wrong
standard for physical explanation. You can only ask for nomological explication. As
Bruno likes to point out "necessity" is always relative to some theory. Theories have
unexplained parts (called axioms or premises). Suppose the theory is that certain kinds
of physical processes instantiate consciousness. Of course stated so nakedly that's not a
very good theory. It's like saying some kind of computation instantiates consciousness.
Both need elaboration to see whether they imply anything unexpected or interesting. But
it's not fair to ask the physical theory to show logical necessity anymore than to ask the
computational theory to show physical necessity.
That is the relevance of the causal closure of the physical in this context.
Consciousness may be one of the things caused.
Brent
Zombies would appear a priori to be the more obvious progeny of such a system.
Consequently we accept the fact of consciousness (if indeed we do) as a brute a
posteriori datum.
David
Brent
The conjunction of this inconvenient fact with a prior commitment to
physical
naturalism often seems to result in a kind of cognitive dissonance. In
Dennett's
case this leads to a denial that consciousness can be distinguished from our
'judgements' about it (i.e. it is an 'illusion') which is superficially at
least
consistent, though ultimately self-defeating. Smolin's unwillingness to deny
consciousness, by contrast, pushes him into frank inconsistency.
We need something better than either of these positions.
David
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