On 19 Jan 2015, at 19:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2015 6:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My belief in God is trivial. All machine introspecting are
confronted to it, and from outside, in the metatheory, we can see
that they can confused it (correctly, or not) with truth.
The problem of the aristotelians is that they often take for
granted the physical reality, which is comprehensible when doing
physics, but when doing theology, the physical universe is an
hypothesis, and as such, there are no evidences for it.
That's fine, but it has no bearing on the relation of atheism to
Christianity.
Then you should have no problem with using god for definition of
god larger than the abramanic god.
The only problem with using god for definition of god (large or
small) is that it's circular. You repeatedly write things like
above, "My belief in God is trivial. All machine introspecting are
confronted to it, and from outside, in the metatheory, we can see
that they can confused it (correctly, or not) with truth." Where
God is "it", but there is no definition. The closest I've seen to
you defining your god is "the unprovable truths of an axiomatic
system" or "the fundamental basis of all being". The former is
former is fairly clear and I can see how a self-referential system
could "confront it". The latter may be a description without a
referent and I don't see why a self-referential system would
necessarily "confront it".
This is explained by the fact that, as Gödel already knew, machines
can prove their own incompleteness. Thay can intuit and infer a notion
of truth from the fact that they can prove <>t -> ~[]<>t, and actually
inferred, from their tries here and now that they can't prove their
consistency, and thus bet on ~[]<>t, and eventually bet on <>t as the
simplest explanation of why they cannot prove <>t. So they can develop
an intuition of truth, and undersatnd that they cannot define it, and
that there are many true propositions that they cannot justify
rationally, etc.
Bruno
Brent
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