On 28 Mar 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Mar 2015, at 00:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know
which one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered
moment was run on one or other or my next anticipated moment
will be run on one or other. If one computer stops it makes no
difference to me and if a third computer running my mind comes
online it makes no difference to me. So effectively there is
only one conscious moment. Under physical supervenience,
stopping all the computers stops the conscious moment.
I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum
part.
In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-
experience), and Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness
in each running (but then if we attribute it to the physical
activity token: we get the absurd conclusion: playing records and
real-time consciousness supervene on a static film, etc.
One problem is that this is an invalid "argument from
incredulity". The fact that you find this conclusion absurd is not
an argument against the conclusion: it is merely a statement about
how you fell about the conclusion -- which could be right or
wrong, and in either case does not depend on how you feel about it.
I don't think so. It is more like when a student get an equation
with a number or a function on a number at the right hand side, and
a differential at the other side.
The stroboscope illustrates the non sensicalness to attribute a
consciousness in real time when a movie is performed. It is really
non-sense, unless adding ad-hoc metaphysics and rules, which you
can do to any theory applied to reality.
If you start from a set of assumptions and derive a contradiction,
then you know that one or more of your assumptions is incorrect. The
contradiction in MGA shows that the assumptions are mutually
incompatible, but it does not show which assumption is invalid. That
is where you appeal to the so-called absurdity of 'consciousness in
real time when a movie is performed'.
Yes, because that "real time" can be shown having no sense (by the
stroboscope argument), or, by showing that you need to give a
"physical active role" to something having no physical activity.
That is the argument from incredulity, and it is invalid.
I will ned to explain the stroboscope.
You cannot conclude that from the MGA since it could equally well be
concluded that computationalism, or the UD, or anything else in the
argument, is incorrect.
Well sure. The point is only about the incompatibility of
computationalism and the physical supervenience thesis. I don't try at
all to prove computationalism. It is just the theory in which I work.
Bruno
Bruce
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