On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body
is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were
created, both would think they were me.
It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be for example,
that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is necessary (why not...) for
being that particular individual... as my current body even if all its matter is
continuously replaced, it is not replaced in one go, it is as said "continuous", all
matter composing my body is causaly linked... I'm not saying it is like that and that
computationalism/functionalism is false (well I believe in computationalism), but
currently, as we're nowhere near to have the ability to make copies of ourselves...
it's hard to say, and as we have no 3rd persons reproduceable and sharable test to be
convinced that the copy would really be us (we only have a metaphysical believe and a
theory to say it should be)... even if that copy was made of flesh and blood and that a
super high res scan would show that it has the exact same atoms with the exact same
properties as the living body it was copied from... we would still have no proof it
would be the same person... we would have a theory that if we succeed to "copy" a
person and if the resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the same
as the "original" that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same person... but
that is not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have
evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he is the same as the original), but
that's all we would have, only the "copy" would really *knows* it... like in a quantum
suicide experiment, only the experimenter staying alive would have more and more
confidence, quantum suicide is true.
That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of
personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual
replacement of the cells in one's body. The problems arise when there is a tie between
two copies for the role of 'closest' continuer. If I kill one of the copies, have I
actually killed a person?
It seems this would play into the Hindu idea of reincarnation. As you die you lose your
memories (a lot even before you die) and as you consciousness fades to black your closest
continuation is a new born baby...or a snail.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
