On 4/13/2015 7:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of
personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual
replacement of the cells in one's body. The problems arise when there is a tie between
two copies for the role of 'closest' continuer. If I kill one of the copies, have I
actually killed a person?
It seems this would play into the Hindu idea of reincarnation. As you die you lose your
memories (a lot even before you die) and as you consciousness fades to black your
closest continuation is a new born baby...or a snail.
The answer here is that as well as being the closest continuer, it is necessary that the
present 'you' be the closest predecessor. The closest predecessor to the snail is
presumably another snail. :-)
Fair point, but it's not clear why I should be closest predecessor to rosy cheeked newborn
- unless you invoke a measure based on physics and chromosomes. It has often been noted
on this list that comp, that is computation, happens not only in brains and computers and
not only in what is conscious, but also in physics, in metabolism, in genetics, in
evolution - just at vastly different rates.
Brent
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