meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 5:50 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person,
my consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing
thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two
spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't
think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some
point. M-man and W-man are different persons, and neither is the
unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is
uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.
This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in
different worlds.
Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.
Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of indiscernibles?
The programs may be run on different computers in our world, and thus
discernible, but from inside the program there is only one
consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program at different
times on the same computer. Same inputs --> same outputs. Not
different from the point of view of the simulation.
Yes, you're right. I should have said like AI's in separate worlds that
are identical except for the observation that split the MW.
It's not really the observation itself that splits the worlds in MWI --
it is decoherence and irreversibility: the multiple independent records
of the experimental result in the environment suggested by Zurek's
einvariance.
Bruce
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