On 16 Apr 2015, at 08:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote: Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.
Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)

And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.

Are you doing this on purpose?

The fact that primary materialism is epistemologically contradictory is the *result* of the UD Argument (UDA).
It is not an assumption. It is what the whole UDA reasoning is for.

You assume a primary physical universe. You have to explain how primary matter makes it possible for a machine to distinguish a physical computation from an arithmetical one, and this without abandoning comp, to make your point.

Bruno







Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to