Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?
Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year. On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Dennis Ochei wrote: >>> >>>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it >>>> isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining >>>> combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday >>>> notion because it is a convenient fiction. >>>> >>> >>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer >>> concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday >>> notion, or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some >>> alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to your >>> purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work. >>> >> >> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which >> case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying >> that step 4 is not valid? >> > > I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part > because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute part > or all of the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not take > appropriate notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to notice > the substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with the world > in exactly the same way as the original. Under the teleportation scenarios, > some new body must be created or provided. I think that in general the > person might notice this. > > If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia > Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the mirror, > you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything because > memories can be lost, or be mistaken. > > In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, but > then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. Creating > copies that are identical to this level -- identical memories, bodies, > environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies, > being identical in all respects, are one person. > > I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive > teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates > the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so > there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is > not cut (as in step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the > duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not make a > lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the recognition of new > persons. > > In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic, > but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for > logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer to > anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade rhetorically > -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more to > do with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can > never be completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always > corrigible, so tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as > they are in mathematics. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/Lp5_VIb6ddY/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
