Right, this is one coherent non-arbitrary view. It's basically what Parfit put forward in Reason's and Persons.
Kolak's is the other view. Property changes do not destroy identity ever. Either view says teleportation is the same as ordinary survival. On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 21 April 2015 at 08:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> > >>> Dennis Ochei wrote: > >>>> > >>>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it > >>>> isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining > >>>> combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday > notion > >>>> because it is a convenient fiction. > >>> > >>> > >>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer > >>> concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday > notion, > >>> or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some alternative > >>> definition of personal identity that is better suited to your > purposes, then > >>> you have to do the necessary analytical work. > >> > >> > >> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which > >> case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying > >> that step 4 is not valid? > > > > > > I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part > because > > of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute part or > all of > > the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not take > appropriate > > notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to notice the > > substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with the world in > > exactly the same way as the original. Under the teleportation scenarios, > > some new body must be created or provided. I think that in general the > > person might notice this. > > > > If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia > Loren > > looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the mirror, you > > might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything because > memories > > can be lost, or be mistaken. > > > > In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, but > > then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. Creating > copies > > that are identical to this level -- identical memories, bodies, > > environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies, > > being identical in all respects, are one person. > > > > I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive > teleportation > > scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates the original > > person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no > > continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut (as > in > > step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the duplicate is a new > > person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference, > > they just enhance the need for the recognition of new persons. > > Of course destructive teleportation creates new persons, but the point > is that it doesn't matter, because ordinary life creates new persons > also, though gradually rather than all at once. If you discovered that > some otherwise perfectly normal people had a condition which caused > all of the matter in their body to be replaced overnight during sleep, > rather than gradually over the course of days, and that you were one > of these people, would it bother you? Or would you doubt that it was > so on the grounds that you were pretty sure you were "the same person" > and not a "new person"? > > > In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic, > > but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for > > logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer > to > > anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade > rhetorically > > -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more > to do > > with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can > never be > > completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always corrigible, > so > > tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as they are in > > mathematics. > > All you have to agree is that it would make no difference to you if > you were perfectly (or close enough) copied. I guess you could > disagree with this but in that case you are deluded about being the > person you believe yourself to be. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/Lp5_VIb6ddY/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <javascript:;>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <javascript:;>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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