On 12 May 2015, at 06:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 9:28 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 May 2015 at 15:18, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 03:06:49PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> On 12 May 2015 at 14:14, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
>
> >
> > Why would we assume that it wouldn't make a difference? That
has never
> > been made clear.
> >
> > For the same reason the calculator repeats the same calculation
given the
> same starting state and inputs. This is surely inherent in the
nature of
> computation? It doesn't matter how large (or small) the
computation is,
> it's deterministic (unless the machine breaks down) and should
behave in
> exactly the same way on each run.
They are different computations, so by comp supervenience, the quales
could be different, or they might not.
You mean they are different computations because they occur at
different times?
I'm confused by this. Bruno introduce computations as brain
replacements saying it meant having the same functional I/O behavior.
For the basic computations, made at the substitution level. Not just
the I/O of the entity (in which case the program nothing would
impelment all dreams).
But then later he has insisted it is not just the I/O, but the
sequence of steps in the computation.
Which needs the i/o of the basic elementary which defines the relevant
computations at the relevant description level.
That would mean that 2+2=4 is different from 2+2+5-5=9-5=4. Are
those different in Platonia?
As computation yes. As statement about numbers, it depends what you
mean.
Maybe it would be clearer if we referred to computational processes;
so both the above would be the same computation, 2+2=4, but
different computational processes.
2 + 2 = 4 is just a statement about something. Computation =
computational process (in the sense of the intensional Church thesis).
And then suppose that consciousness supervenes on computational
processes.
Computation means computational process. If not we talk about the
relation or function computed, and not of the computation itself.
As I said, a computation is a sequence of comp states, bring out by
some universal numbers. Any sequence of states which does not invoke
the universal system doing the acomputation is a description of a
computation, and not a computation, which is really a dynamical
relation (defined in arithmeoc, wih the main clock being given by the
successor relation on the natural numbers: it is block-dynamical.
Bruno
Brent
Everything else is identical, to start with (in the first stage of
the MGA, I mean - we only convert the computation being rerun into
a recording one step at a time, I think, so before we can get
anywhere we have to agree that the first step works, which is just
to re-run the same computation using recorded inputs. But so far
there doesn't even seem to be agreement on that, unless I've
misunderstood.)
> I didn't understand what you meant about the quale. Which systems
are you
> referring to?
The observer and its environment. It is plausible that all observers
observe something, or all quales are about something. I'm suggesting
that could give leverage into asserting that a constant computation
(the type that a recording is) cannot instantiate a conscious moment.
OK, I think I see. Although I don't see that a recording is even a
constant computation (or only to the extent that everything is,
assuming physics is).
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