On 26 Jun 2015, at 01:04, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
What part of physics is not computable?
I don't know if that non computability comes only from the FPI, but
roughly speaking, with comp, it is astonishing that something remains
computable ... until we take the self-referentialness into account.
What is not computable are the details that does not count, below of
substitution/isolation level.
Not computable does not mean non exploitable, like with quantum
computation.
The physical reality is made of the map (the orbitals) of the
accessible and most probable continuations.
You need to understand things by yourself. I have divided the main
argument in eight steps, but just going to step seven illustrates the
problem. It relates also the mind-body problem to cosmology, by the
existence or not of complete UD executions there. Telling which steps
you have a problem with will help me to accomodate my comments to you.
But with comp, we can't use matter or god to select the computations,
only a "fair" measure defined by the points of view will do.
The big heroin is the universal machine/number. Plato might not have
been that happy, as the machine put a lot of mess in Platonia.
The ontology is simple and small, the sigma_1 truth. But the internal
possible epistemologies are unboundable in complexity. For some
reason, they get quickly analytical or higher order logical.
It is the computability, and the apparent lacks of helps from the
arithmetical gods (set sof numbers of complexity above sigma_1), in
physics, which should be explained. It is part of the comp formulation
of the problem.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jun 25, 2015 3:51 am
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 25 Jun 2015, at 04:15, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
But what of pancomputationalism?
On what "pan" is applied?
If "pan" is large and contains whatever is not me, then that is
provably non computational. If "I am a machine" (exactly: if my 3-
self is Turing emulable) then Not-Me is not a machine.
Only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth is Turing emulable. Most
machine's property are not Turing emulable. I showed this for the
predicate "being the code of a total computable function": this is
not computably solvable.
Is the physical reality pancomputable. Normally no. Its computable
aspect might be a problem for comp, except that physics does contain
non computable aspects too, of the same kind as the FPI (the wave
collapse, for example). So even the physical is plausibly not
entirely computable, but this can be approximated in comp by
lowering the substitution level enough.
Bruno
Sent from AOL Mobile Mail
-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark < johnkcl...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list < everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jun 24, 2015 08:57 PM
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jun 24, 2015 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> neither will contain "I see Moscow and I see Washington"
Yes, and because John Clark HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and there are
now two John Clarks it would not be expected that just one interview
would settle the question of what cities John Clark saw. The first
interviewee says "I am John Clark and I see Moscow". The second
interviewee says "I am John Clark and I see Washington".
So Quentin, from the above information even a man with a room
temperature IQ such as yourself should be able to answer the
question " what cities did John Clark see?".
> If you could quit the list with your horses that would be
really cool
You make it clear that if I quit the list it would make you very
happy, therefore I will not quite the list. You're a lousy
psychologist, you should have said you'd cry like a baby if I quit
the list.
John K Clark
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