On 24 Jul 2015, at 21:56, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>>I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You
has no idea what P(W & M) = 1 means.
> How many times this need to be repeated.
Until it is not gibberish.
> W refers to the experience of self-localization done after
opening the door after the duplication
So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize
(Pompous-speak for see) Washington is 1.
> cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W
So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize
Moscow is 1. So the probability the Helsinki Man, aka you, will see
both cities is ___ [fill in the blank]
>> Please explain exactly what the bet is.
> You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of
the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will
see one city or two cities.
That's 3 usages of that damn personal pronoun in just 33 words,
and so John Clark will ask for the 100^100 time, WHO THE HELL
IS "YOU" ?!
Please, quote the whole text I wrote, and tell me what you don't
understand there, as it answers completely and clearly, at everyone
satisfaction, that very question, and why it entails the first person
indeterminism or indeterminacy.
"you" always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at
Helsinki. Its only *first* person experience accessible are the
incompatible W and M *experience* described yesterday, and which
excludes already your P(W & M) = 1.
If you omit quoting the explanation, and saying what you don't
understand, ,it is obvious it makes no sense I repeat the
explanations. I wrote that yesterday, so they are not far. Please do
that.
Bruno
John K Clark
And if one city, which one, with which expectation.
> No ambiguity in pronouns at all,
Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W & M) = 1
*you* told me that P(W & M) = 1.
You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective
sensation of seeing something after opening a door.
P(W & M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong.
P(W & M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I
opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused
together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city,
and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their
personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W.,
making P(W v M) true.
It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for
the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city)
= 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed
in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the
simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like
"white noise" is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration.
I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to
city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can
attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing
the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or
a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience
diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes
making that divergence.
The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki.
Exemples:
I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front
of a door.
I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink
a cup of coffee.
I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I
will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow.
And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has
been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is
only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been
confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a
door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city,
among Washington and Moscow.
All right?
Bruno
John K Clark
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