On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
I will ask you the same question as I
did Brent: do you conclude from the fact
that when you toss a coin it comes up
either as head or tails that the world
does not split into two parallel
versions of you, one of which sees heads
and the other tails?
I would conclude that a coin toss does
not provide any evidence for multiple
worlds or a split. The only evidence we
have from this data is that the outcome
of the toss is uncertain. There is no
evidence there for any split of anything.
It is not evidence FOR a split but is it
evidence AGAINST a split?
It is evidence that the assumption of a split
is not necessary in order to understand
everyday happenings. So, by the application of
Occam's Razor, no split happens.
So you agree that we would still observe the
probabilities we do if we lived in a deterministic
world in whaich all possibilities are realised?
No, because not all possibilities happen in this
world. If all possibilities were realized in this
world, then there would be no uncertainty, no
probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be
the same thing. All the horses would win the
Melbourne cup; and we don't live in such a world.
Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world,
but they might happen in parallel worlds that don't
interact with each other. The argument is that
probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know
which world you will find yourself in. You bet on the
favourite in the race because you think you are more
likely to end up in a world in which the favourite wins.
In other words, probabilities can make perfect sense in
a single deterministic world. This was understood a long
time ago with the development of statistical mechanics.
The idea that "all possibilities happen in parallel
worlds" does not actually make a lot of sense. There is
no current physical theory that implies this (without
the addition of a lot of unevidenced assumptions). So
probabilities do not emerge from this, they come from
quite simple assumptions of randomness and ignorance.
Probability in the MWI of quantum mechanics is
problematic. Regardless of claims to be able to derive
the Born Rule in Everettian models, all attempts fail
because they are circular -- they need the Born rule in
order to have non-interacting worlds, so you cannot then
use these independent worlds to derive the Born rule.
Gleason's theorem is no help -- it suffers from all the
same problems as the Deutsch-Wallace approach.
You don't seem to be disputing that we would still
experience a probabilistic world even if all possibilities
were actually realised, even though you do dispute that we
in fact live in such a world.
I'm not sure if you are disputing that, to give a simple
model case, if a coin was tossed and the world split in two,
with one version of you seeing heads and the other tails,
the probability of each outcome is 1/2.
Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not
in evidence, so their relevance to the question of
probabilities is questionable.
Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split
is just a made-up example to give the result you want, so
again its relevance is dubious. There is no sensible physical
theory in which the world splits on classical coin tosses.
If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in
which the program forks every time a coin is tossed, one fork
seeing heads and the other tails. You are an observer in this
world and you have this information, so you know for certain that
"all possibilities are realised" when the coin is tossed. What
would you say about your expectation of seeing heads?
I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with
one branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded
"person duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a
duplication, two new persons are created, so the probability that
the original person will see either heads or tails is precisely
zero, because that person no longer exists after the duplication.
After the coin has been tossed a few times, you (or one of the
entities identifying as you) will say that, despite the opinion he
expressed on 9th September on the Everything List, it does seem that
he has survived the duplication and that heads comes up about half the
time.
But he would say the same thing if only one fork of the program were
executed at each branch. So whether the other branches are executed is
not related to observations.
Brent
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