On 9 September 2015 at 16:46, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 9/09/2015 2:33 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 9 September 2015 at 14:28, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> > wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 2:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 9 September 2015 at 13:40, Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> >> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >> >>> On 9/09/2015 1:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett < >>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>> >>>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett < >>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not in >>>>> evidence, so their relevance to the question of probabilities is >>>>> questionable. >>>>> >>>>> Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split is just a >>>>> made-up example to give the result you want, so again its relevance is >>>>> dubious. There is no sensible physical theory in which the world splits on >>>>> classical coin tosses. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in which >>>> the program forks every time a coin is tossed, one fork seeing heads and >>>> the other tails. You are an observer in this world and you have this >>>> information, so you know for certain that "all possibilities are realised" >>>> when the coin is tossed. What would you say about your expectation of >>>> seeing heads? >>>> >>>> I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with one >>>> branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded "person >>>> duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a duplication, two >>>> new persons are created, so the probability that the original person will >>>> see either heads or tails is precisely zero, because that person no longer >>>> exists after the duplication. >>>> >>> >>> After the coin has been tossed a few times, you (or one of the entities >>> identifying as you) will say that, despite the opinion he expressed on 9th >>> September on the Everything List, it does seem that he has survived the >>> duplication and that heads comes up about half the time. >>> >>> It is a question whether it is just the person who is duplicated, or >>> whether it is the whole world split into two non-communicating replicates. >>> In the former case, two new persons are created and they will experience >>> normal probabilistic outcomes of coin tosses. The second case (duplicate, >>> non-interacting worlds), is indistinguishable from a simple series of coin >>> tosses in this one world -- duplication has added nothing. >>> >> >> What if you are locked in a prison cell isolated from the world, and the >> prison cell is duplicated without your knowledge? What if in a year you are >> released and meet your duplicate? What if you are never released but are >> informed of the duplication? >> >> You can make any number of artificial scenarios that appear to imply >> almost anything you want. Whereas, actually, they imply nothing at all, >> because such artificial scenarios have nothing to do with the real world. >> >> If under these duplication scenarios you are fooled into thinking that >> you have not been duplicated, then you might think that you have continued >> as the same unique person. You would, however, be mistaken in that belief. >> Nothing unusual here -- most people have mistaken beliefs about any number >> of things. >> > > You could also claim that you are fooled into thinking that you have > continued as the same unique person in everyday life, since the matter > constituting your body has changed. It's arbitrary to say that in the > everyday life scenario you have survived while in other duplication > scenarios you only have the delusional belief that you have survived. > > Not at all. In everyday life there is a continuity of body as well as of > thought and memory. Plus the all important fact that the continuer is > unique. Immediately you introduce a non-uniqueness into the continuer(s), > you destroy the conditions for continued personal identity. > The other way to look at it is that there is no continuity of body, thought and memory in everyday life because you are continually dying and being replaced with a copy who believes he is you. It is no less legitimate than saying the copy isn't you. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
