On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum field > theory? General relativity? > > > Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in > biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave. > > > Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian physics > and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics. So I think you > give to much credit to computationalism. I don't think there's been even > one application of Godel's theorem, much less implicit reliance on it. > > > Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often vague, > ideas. There is not yet any working theory. > > > Sure there is: If you change some process in the brain it will change the > conscious experience of the person. And there are lots of details to that > theory as to how the changes happen and what the mechanism is. Which > incidentally, computationalism contributed nothing. > Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems: *Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which can both influence and be influenced by the physical world. However, it violates conservation of energy or conservation of momentum to suppose a non-physical body can influence the physical world. *Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which is influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the physical world. This theory fails to explain why we talk about consciousness, or even how the theory of epihenominalism was communicated. It also fails to address the necessity / purpose of consciousness: it might as well have been bred out of existence (perhaps you're one of the few beings left with consciousness genes) as it would confer no evolutionary advantages. *Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical world and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other, but through God are made to agree with one another. This suffers from Occam's razor. The physical world would serve no point and might as well be eliminated, as the existence of the mental world made to agree with a physical world would be sufficient to explain all observations. This theory prevents any further understanding of consciousness. *Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but keeping the mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in building predictive frameworks (such as physics). Why when we see something go up, is it so often followed by the thought of seeing it come back down? This theory prevents any further understanding of consciousness. *Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one mapping between mental states and brain states. This theory has trouble accounting for how different creatures, with different anatomy, brain structures, or made of different materials could be conscious. The theory implies zombies, or different conscious states even in functionally identical configurations, and as such has trouble explaining how cochlear implants or artificial retinas would work. *Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in physics which are somehow necessary for consciousness. Penrose supposes this might be quantum theory, because he thinks humans can solve the halting problem but computers cannot. No evidence that humans can solve the halting problem exists, however, and no known operations in physics are incomputable. *Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and generality of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers such as Searle, and Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate all behaviors associated with human intelligence, however, they think this computer would never be conscious. This leads to issues such as fading/dancing qualia in cases of gradual neuron replacement, and philsophical zombies. It is also curious in that both silicon computers and biological neurons are made of the same thing: quarks and electrons. So does biological naturalism supposes at consciousness is in the particular atoms/molecules? That's the competition computationalism has. Computationalism is appealing because it suffers none of the problems the above theories do. It does not supposes super-natrual souls, it allows for different brains to have the same experiences, it allows for brains to be made of different materials and still be conscious, it doesn't rely on undiscovered physics, and permits gradual neuron-by-neuron replacement without leading to zombies or altered states of consciousness (which you would have but not be able to communicate). > > > Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter appearance > already. > > > So does "God did it." but both explanations explain too much. > What is too much? Too much to fit in your head? Too much to teach kids in school? Too many details about far away galaxies/worlds you'd rather remain ignorant about? > > > Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some identity link. It works > well to make local prediction, but it fails on consciousness (when it does > not eliminate it). > > > It doesn't fail. It just fails to meet your critereon to having an > axiomatic explanation. But even quantum mechanics doesn't have an > axiomatic basis - or rather it has several different ones; which is typical > of physical theories. > > Physical theories are then analogous to axiomatic systems. We assume them at the start, and then see if they allow us to explain more without leading to contradictions. Jason > Physics is not a science addressing those questions. > > > True, but computer science and neurophysiology are addressing them. > > > Theology is the original science addressing those question, > > > Theology is the science of gods and man's relation to god. > > and indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit better > the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter appearance) than > physics, when physics is seen as a theology (Aristotle idea). > > > It's really a slur to label physics "Aristotlean". Aristotle never did > physics. He did arm chair theorizing which he could have immediately > refuted by simple experiments which he never thought of doing. Thales and > Anaximander and Aristarchus could much more reasonably considered physicist > - but their influence was cut off by theology, by referring all mysteries > to the action of gods. > > > You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or theology, > and at the same time you argue that physics is the only correct theology, > but then give us what is your non-computationalist theory of mind. > > > That's a fair challenge. But it's usual in the early stages to the > development of a science that one has many observations but only local > effective theories and no over-arching scheme. Even in physics there is no > over arching theory that includes quantum mechanics and general relativity; > but that's not the same as having no theory of physics. There have been > over arching theories, theologies, but they've never proven productive. > Historically all the progress has been made by looking at the shadows on > the cave wall and saying, "Let's see what we can figure out from them." > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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