On 10/13/2015 6:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum
field theory? General relativity?
Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution,
in biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.
Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian
physics and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics.
So I think you give to much credit to computationalism. I don't
think there's been even one application of Godel's theorem, much
less implicit reliance on it.
Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.
Sure there is: If you change some process in the brain it will
change the conscious experience of the person. And there are lots
of details to that theory as to how the changes happen and what
the mechanism is. Which incidentally, computationalism contributed
nothing.
Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems:
*Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which can
both influence and be influenced by the physical world. However, it
violates conservation of energy or conservation of momentum to suppose
a non-physical body can influence the physical world.
*Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which is
influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the
physical world. This theory fails to explain why we talk about
consciousness, or even how the theory of epihenominalism was
communicated. It also fails to address the necessity / purpose of
consciousness: it might as well have been bred out of existence
(perhaps you're one of the few beings left with consciousness genes)
as it would confer no evolutionary advantages.
*Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical
world and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other, but
through God are made to agree with one another. This suffers from
Occam's razor. The physical world would serve no point and might as
well be eliminated, as the existence of the mental world made to agree
with a physical world would be sufficient to explain all observations.
This theory prevents any further understanding of consciousness.
*Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but
keeping the mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in
building predictive frameworks (such as physics). Why when we see
something go up, is it so often followed by the thought of seeing it
come back down? This theory prevents any further understanding of
consciousness.
*Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one
mapping between mental states and brain states. This theory has
trouble accounting for how different creatures, with different
anatomy, brain structures, or made of different materials could be
conscious.
That's like saying different automobiles are made of different
materials; so there's trouble accounting for how they can both move.
The theory implies zombies, or different conscious states even in
functionally identical configurations,
No it doesn't.
and as such has trouble explaining how cochlear implants or artificial
retinas would work.
Computationalism has not explanation of how natural retinas work (or
anything else).
*Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is
false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in
physics which are somehow necessary for consciousness. Penrose
supposes this might be quantum theory, because he thinks humans can
solve the halting problem but computers cannot. No evidence that
humans can solve the halting problem exists, however, and no known
operations in physics are incomputable.
*Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and
generality of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers
such as Searle, and Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate
all behaviors associated with human intelligence, however, they think
this computer would never be conscious. This leads to issues such as
fading/dancing qualia in cases of gradual neuron replacement, and
philsophical zombies. It is also curious in that both silicon
computers and biological neurons are made of the same thing: quarks
and electrons. So does biological naturalism supposes at consciousness
is in the particular atoms/molecules?
That's the competition computationalism has. Computationalism is
appealing because it suffers none of the problems the above theories
do. It does not supposes super-natrual souls, it allows for different
brains to have the same experiences,
Which is a bug, not a feature. Any two brains are in different
positions and will be receiving different sensory inputs. That
computationalism "allows" them to have the same experience is like
saying physics allows two different volumes of gas to have all their
molecules in the same position.
it allows for brains to be made of different materials and still be
conscious,
And how does physicalism NOT allow this?
it doesn't rely on undiscovered physics,
And it doesn't rely on discovered physics either - contrary to the
common observation that the consciousness of brains DOES depend on physics.
and permits gradual neuron-by-neuron replacement without leading to
zombies or altered states of consciousness (which you would have but
not be able to communicate).
Computationalism "permits" this because it has not theory of what it
does not permit.
Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter
appearance already.
So does "God did it." but both explanations explain too much.
What is too much? Too much to fit in your head? Too much to teach kids
in school? Too many details about far away galaxies/worlds you'd
rather remain ignorant about?
Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some identity link.
It works well to make local prediction, but it fails on
consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).
It doesn't fail. It just fails to meet your critereon to having
an axiomatic explanation. But even quantum mechanics doesn't have
an axiomatic basis - or rather it has several different ones;
which is typical of physical theories.
Physical theories are then analogous to axiomatic systems. We assume
them at the start, and then see if they allow us to explain more
without leading to contradictions.
They are analogous, but not the same. The same physical theory can have
many different axiomatizations. It's not enough to explain more; a good
theory explains why THIS and not THAT.
Brent
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