On 30 Jun 2016, at 20:08, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​A universal Turing machine can compute all Turing computable functions. And also all Lambda computable function, and actually,

​An​ ​abstract ​universal Turing machine can compute​ ​ exactly diddly squat​. A physical ​universal Turing machine ​on the other hand ​can compute ​anything capable of being computed.​


In your theory. No problem, but it is incompatible with computationalism.

Other add that the machine needs to be baptize for doing that, and it is not logically more invalid than your move.




​> ​Once you accept Yes-doctor,

​But I don't accept it unless the Turing Machine simulating me is ​PHYSICAL.


the whole point is that is enough for getting the non physical immaterialist consequences.




​> ​If computationalism is true, there is no way for us to distinguish *introspectively* which universal computations supports us,

​So what? We are not limited to introspection, we can​observe the outside world and even perform experiments on it and we can​ easily see​ ​that computations are ALWAYS physical, and we can see that the physical brain makes calculations and these calculations are what makes us who we are; change the physical stuff in the brain and the computations change, change the computations and your conscious experience changes.

​> ​human physicalness is an indexical.

 ​H​uman physicalness is an indexical​ what?​

​>>​​Perhaps your "big picture" is just a bit too big. If the fundamental meaning of the word "nothing" is infinite unbounded homogeneity in every dimension, and I can't think of a better one that conforms with our normal use of the word, then your "big picture" is nothing.

​> ​You seem to be negative for the purpose of being negative.

No, I'm being negative for a good cause.​ ​One should be negative against illogical ill formed metaphysical ideas masquerading as mathematics.

​​>> ​John Clark is not stuck at step 3, ​​Bruno Marchal is. ​Bruno Marchal assumes ​the very thing Bruno Marchal is trying to prove, ​Bruno assumes that because ​when ​looking into the past there is ​always ​a unique meaning to the word ​ "you" there will ​be ​a unique meaning to that personal pronoun ​when ​looking into the future too​;​

​> ​Not at all. Quite the contrary. All what is used is the talk of each duplicated people.

If the person is duplicated then the question "what will YOU see next?" is not well formed and it is equivalent to "what will flobkneequicks see next?"; neither question has an answer.


All your copies disagree.

IIf it was ill-formed, then the question what spin will you get would be ill-formed too in QM, and in physics in general.

Your argument that the difference is that the doppelgangers can meet has been answered by many people, so try another one.






The question "what will John Clark see next?" has an answer but Bruno absolutely insists on using the personal pronoun, hasn't anyone wondered why Bruno is so adamant about doing so? It's because personal pronouns are a convenient place to hide the gaping holes in Bruno's argument.


I gave you version without pronoun, and then showed that it was easy to provide a simple semantics for the pronouns. Then the math part define all the pronouns with the second recursion theorem of Kleene, and its intensional variants.





​> ​You are the one using bad religion to invalidate a demonstration, Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.



You illustrate very well that people who call themselves non- religious are more dogmatic on their beliefs than religious educated people who are aware of their historical dogma, and try to not invoke them in all reasoning.

At least you try, thanls for that, as it is infinitely more respectful than any other opponents I have heard about, which either do not try, or eventually got the point after some finite conversation with me or some colleagues.

Bruno





​ John K Clark​






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