On 01 Jul 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 10:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> An abstract universal Turing machine can
compute exactly diddly squat. A physical universal Turing
machine on the other hand can compute anything capable of
being computed.
> In your theory. No problem
True.
> but it is incompatible with computationalism.
Bullshit. Computationalism says intelligent behavior is
caused by computations, and I'm saying the same thing.
That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word "cause" is
better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.
Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing emulable
physically. We know where you stop in the argument, and nobody seemed
to understand your point.
>>> Once you accept Yes-doctor,
>> But I don't accept it unless the Turing Machine
simulating me is PHYSICAL.
>the whole point is that is enough for getting the non physical
immaterialist consequences.
The whole point of what?
Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/translation in
elementary arithmetic.
>> If the person is duplicated then the question "what will YOU
see next?"is not well formed and it is equivalent to "what will
flobkneequicks see next?"; neither question has an answer.
> All your copies disagree.
All copies will disagree about what the answer turned out to be,
and none of them would be right and none of them would be wrong
because the question was not well formed.
The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki, you
(whoever you are) know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol)
with probability one that you will feel yourself in a box, and that
you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after opening
the box. What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be
Moscow or if it will be Washington. By the numerical identity of the
copies in the reconstruction boxes, it is arguably equivalent to
throwing a coin.
It takes more than a question mark to turn gibberish into a
question.
> If it was ill-formed, then the question what spin will you
get would be ill-formed too in QM, and in physics in general.
That is untrue because, unlike the case with the people
duplicating machine stuff, with QM after the experiment is over
everybody in the observable universe agrees about what the answer
turned out to be. So although right now I don't know the answer to
the question "will I see that atom decay in the next 30 seconds?" it
is a perfectly well formed question and 30 seconds from now both I
and everybody in the observable universe will agree on what the
answer turned out to be. But with the duplicating machine stuff
NOBODY will EVER agree on what the answer to the question "what city
will YOU see in 30 seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds
the pronoun will have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a
question, it's just gibberish.
That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural* notion.
The superposition of the cat (say) is contagious to the observer and
then to those the observer will meet.
To have that first person plural notion in the computationalist frame,
you need to imagine a collection of persons going all together in the
reading-annihilation box, In Helsinki. Then, after pushing the button,
all persons "with you" will see the same city, and all observers will
agree on which city is seen. The fact that they will also all find
themselves in the other city change nothing for all first person view
involved. You can make them interacting or not: it will not change
that in Helsinki those betting on WvM won, those betting on W&M lose,
and those betting on W (resp M) won and lose one halve the times in
the average, when that experience is reiterated (say).
>> The question "what will John Clark see next?" has an answer
but Bruno absolutely insists on using the personal pronoun, hasn't
anyone wondered why Bruno is so adamant about doing so? It's because
personal pronouns are a convenient place to hide the gaping holes in
Bruno's argument.
> I gave you version without pronoun,
BULLSHIT. Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno
Marchal's theory and would die a quick death without it.
That is correct. But that is why I am able to eliminate them, as
eliminating pronouns is technically easy for mathematical logicians.
The new thing is that I have shown how incompleteness makes impossible
for a machine to avoid the distinstinction between the first person
notions (including the selves and the related pronouns) from the third
person selves. Actually, Theaetetus got the main idea 2000 years ago,
but Socrates refuted it, and incompleteness shows precisely where
Socrates went wrong. Of course Socrates could not have been aware of
incompleteness, Church thesis, universal systems, etc.
> You illustrate very well that people who call themselves non-
religious are more dogmatic on their beliefs than religious educated
people
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
There are many religions.
In the materialist religions, with the belief in some primitive matter
or primitive physical laws, it is frequent that the believer is not
aware of the faith needed to sustain his belief. That comes plausibly
from the fact that the materialist bet is animal-instinctive and
inherited through a long history. This makes many materialists often
into confusing physics with metaphysics, and they take their religious
view like if it was the granted scientific view. But modern physics
and mathematics (and theology up to +500) begun by doubting that view,
which came back through Aristotle theology.
The physical theories can be 100% correct, and yet physicalism can
still be false. Physicists only measure numbers, and infer relations
between numbers, that is, they try theories. By definition of theory,
they are independent of their interpretations, and they rarely aboard
metaphysical questions, nor commit themselves ontologically.
With QM, and with computationalism, we do have interpretation
problems, but with computationalism, the metaphysics becomes related
to physics in a precise special way, and some metaphysical points,
like materialism, can be tested more or less directly, and in this
case, materialism up to now predicts something (primary matter, some
magic or a special type of infinity violating Z1*) not yet observed.
So the empirical evidences side on the absence of primary matter, and
on the falsity of physicalism.
The physical becomes a first person plural mode of self-observation in
arithmetic, and the prediction is that if we look close enough to
ourselves, we are confronted to another kind of special infinity---
the"parallel/alternate" computations interfering statistically in a
quantized way provided by Z1*or S4grz1, or X1*, and the empiric
evidences confirms this up to now.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
