On 22 Jun 2016, at 23:35, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> mathematics is the best language for describing physics, but
the point is mathematics is a language and physics isn't,
physics just is.
> I give an example, with arithmetic. You have a
language, that is, symbols and grammar. [blah blah] Then you
have the semantics
But semantics is about meaning,
Indeed.
you've got to give those symbols a meaning, otherwise you're just
talking about squiggles. And by the way, "=" is just another
squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the reason
mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is
that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the
real PHYSICAL world and people get the connection.
The theory of model is a branch of pure mathematics. Model = semantic,
and it does not refer to physics, but to mathematical structure. A
model is a set together with some structure. Then we define a notion
of satisfaction, etc. Logicians studied the theories and their
semantics. Semantics are indispensable to prove that some propositions
are not theorems. That is old ideas. To prove that the euclid axiom on
parallel is not derivable from euclid geometry, mathematicians
discovered this with the non riemannian geometry, well before we
suspect our physical world to be possibly non riemannian. To sum up,
there is no physical assumption, and no physical ontological
commitment, in the theory of models/semantics.
Using symbols is good way to think about something if you can make
that connection, but without the physical there are no semantics,
its just squiggles, it's literally meaningless.
You just do advertising for physicalism.
Physicalism might be true, but my point is that it is incompatible
with the assumption that the brain is Turing emulable. Then I show
that physics can be constructively derived from machine's theology,
and where the logic of matter must appear, we got already a quantum
logic, which has not yet been refuted (but could very well tomorrow).
> Then you have the theories,
And to be worth a damn theories have to be about something not
just squiggles
Arithmetic is about numbers. We develop intuition (and thus informal
semantics) well before developing theories. That intution might come
from physical observation, but this does not make the numbers physical.
> Robinson Arithmetic [...]
Squiggles.
> And we are not obsessed [by consciousness]. We might be
tired of its being pushed under the rug.
For every sentence about how intelligent behavior works there
are a thousand about how consciousness works because theorizing
about consciousness is many orders of magnitude easier than
theorizing about intelligence due to the fact that intelligence
theories actually have to perform while a consciousness theory
doesn't need to do anything.
Then you should appreciate my explanation that computationalism
provide an experimentally testable theory of consciousness, notably.
>> Whatever consciousness is one thing is very clear, it can't
be produced entirely from the stuff at the fundamental level of
reality,
> Ah! Glad you saw this.
So you agree with me that even if mathematics is the most
fundamental thing you still need matter to produce intelligence and
consciousness.
No, as computationalism is monist (and has to be). I was just glad
that you seem aware the stuff is not enough, but then, if you keep the
stuff and take the rest, you are dualist.
> The notion of computation belongs to arithmetic. Only a
physical implementation of a computation needs physical assumptions.
So you agree that arithmetic alone is not sufficient for
physical computations;
That would contradict the UDA conclusion.
therefore physics must have something that arithmetic doesn't.
Physics is a subbranch of the theology of numbers, if we assume
computationalism. That is what has been proved, and this has led to
the first explanation of why there is a physical reality, why it is
quantum and have a many-world aspect.
Bruno
John K Clark
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