On 18 Jul 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 18/07/2016 3:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:
So in your duplication scenarios, the case in which the original is
duplicated, but continues to exist, the closest continuer theory
would have some measure that gave significance to bodily
continuity, so we would say that the original person continued
intact, and that, although sharing some background with the
continuer, a new individual was created in the manufactured
duplicate. In the duplication scenario in which the original is cut
or deleted, then there is no preferred unique continuer, so there
is a tie, and we would say that two new persons are created (the
original having been destroyed).
If you think these things through, you can see that this theory of
personal identity resolves all the problems that your
"psychological" theory encounters.
Without a psychological theory of continuity this whole discussion
would be unnecessary. We could just say that a person has been
copied, the two copies are identical, and the original was
destroyed. The problems arise because each copy has memories of
being the original and, because of the phenomenon of first person
experience, feels that he is the one true copy persisting through
time - even though intellectually he knows this is not true.
We all know that feelings are an unreliable guide to anything.
Careful analysis is a much better guide to what is actually going
on. I might, in a moment of waking confusion, fell that I am the
reincarnation of Cleopatra, but that is not a reliable feeling.
But when we tackle on the mind-body problem, or the first-person/third
person relation problem, we must invoke such feeling, or similar. Here
the feeling is not much to be the "real true" guy, as the
computationalist can accept that it is just one implementation of it,
among others. But what is inescapable is the feeling to have receive
one bit of information. And here we suppose by default that the guy
has a brain working enough well to address question like "what is that
city in front of me", and write the answer in a stable diary or in his
local brain available at the time and place he feel, indeed, to be.
The though experience can be made with little robots, using simple RAM
access, or any enough stable memory, and UDA does not use the quale
aspect of the self-localization, note. (that aspect is addressed in
the translation in arithmetic though.)
Bruno
Bruce
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