On 18/07/2016 3:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
So in your duplication scenarios, the case in which the original
is duplicated, but continues to exist, the closest continuer
theory would have some measure that gave significance to bodily
continuity, so we would say that the original person continued
intact, and that, although sharing some background with the
continuer, a new individual was created in the manufactured
duplicate. In the duplication scenario in which the original is
cut or deleted, then there is no preferred unique continuer, so
there is a tie, and we would say that two new persons are created
(the original having been destroyed).
If you think these things through, you can see that this theory of
personal identity resolves all the problems that your
"psychological" theory encounters.
Without a psychological theory of continuity this whole discussion
would be unnecessary. We could just say that a person has been copied,
the two copies are identical, and the original was destroyed. The
problems arise because each copy has memories of being the original
and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels that
he is the one true copy persisting through time - even though
intellectually he knows this is not true.
We all know that feelings are an unreliable guide to anything. Careful
analysis is a much better guide to what is actually going on. I might,
in a moment of waking confusion, fell that I am the reincarnation of
Cleopatra, but that is not a reliable feeling.
Bruce
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