On 15 Jul 2016, at 15:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 15/07/2016 8:31 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what
it has to
do with Bruno's theory. He just proposes this as an illustration of
first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation
of QM.
It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what
does
probability refer to when everything happens. The question of
which JKC
just gets mapped to which world.
Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven
steps of
Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he
moves the
Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new
actually
happens.
I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the
previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without
them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic
tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose.
It is easy to dismiss the move to platonia at any time.
read the apers or my posts. There is no "move in Platonia". There is
only "arithmetical realism", the belief that 2+2=4. That is assumed in
all physical theories.
Confusing 1p and 3p is not relevant here.
Then you are changing the topic.
He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics
and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a
distracting irrelevance to the main argument,
The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose
materialist
self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism).
Materialism or physicalism? I don't think I am trying to defend the
idea that matter excludes the mental. Besides, where is the self-
contradiction in materialism (or physicalism)?
Step 7 (with Occam), or step 8 (with a much weaker Occam).
I don't see how
these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move
to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place"
by
forcing him to defang his argument.
If you propose the UD in platonia
The UD existence is a theorem in Peano Arithmetic. Or a metatheorem
about Robinson Arithmetic.
and derive physics from computations through conscious persons, the
"contradictions of materialism", if there are such, become irrelevant.
How could the theorem becomes irrelevant. UDA is the proof that
materialism needs non Turing emulable/recoverable magic in the brain
to make sense, and thus contradict computationalism. (recoverable =
FPI recoverable).
and depends so heavily on a
particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless.
Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your
own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the
present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward.
Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the
topic of personal identity!"
People on this list seem to be very quick to interpret a lack of
philosophical insight into anything (theories of personal identity
here) as an ad hominem, whereas it is often a simple statement of
fact.
All I see is that you pursue the confusion between 1p and 3p, but
taking the definition, agreed by everyone, even JKC, we get the result
directly, when taking the fundamental difference between the 1p and
the 3p view.
Do you agree that both the W-guy and the M-guy (in the step 3
protocol) get both one bit of information?
Bruno himself is always criticizing his critics for a lack of
understanding of modal logics and computer science.
When I criticize attempt to refute AUDA (the translation of UDA in
arithmetic, or the interview of the Löbian machine). But here we are
in UDA, which does not presuppose modal logics nor many computer
science, just an intuition on computation, that is a passive
understanding of how a computer works. I got UDA by a reflexion in
molecular biology. I realize later that the main thing already exiosts
in arithmetic, and that computer science brought an exact biology and
psychology, and theology, in arithmetic.
You, on the contrary do the constant philosophical error consisting in
a invocation of some "real thing" or "reality", well a God, in the
theoretical sense of the antic greeks.
I find the commenters on this list to be, in general,
philosophically naive.
That is the move: I lost the argument, so I will content myself with
insulting the audience.
The theory of personal identity behind the duplication protocols is
not clearly spelled out,
It is. Even JKC agrees on it. What is clearly spelled out, but that
you want to dismiss, is the obvious fact that both the H and M guy got
one bit of information, from each of such personal view attained in
that protocol.
but it is basically a psychological theory, that places heavy
emphasis on personal memories, though no doubt does give some import
to things like character, values, beliefs, desires, intentions and
so forth. There are several alternative theories of personal
identity, none is without some problems, but I think that the
closest continuer theory comes closest to surmounting the obstacles.
There is no closer continuers in step 3. See step 4 for a definitive
refutation of the closed continuer theory in the computationalist
frame. That should be obvious, from digital computationalism, as the
delay of reconstitution is not available from the first person view,
see step 2 for that.
Again, you show how much all UDA steps are needed, as what you say
contradict already steps 1, 2, 4, 5, and ... 3.
Bruno
Bruce
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