On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 05:23:16PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 14 Dec 2016, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote: > > >I don't see why you would say physicalism needs to be assumed to > >explain the predictive power of physics. > > To predict (exactly and in principle) something physical you have > only one way: to compute the relative FPI on UD*. (Which is > obviously highly non-computable, as even "W" or "M" is already not > computable in the simple self-duplication, with "W" and "M" refering > to the experiences of finding oneself in Washington and finding > oneself in Moscow respectively (step 3 of the Sane04 slide).
Predictions are never exact in 100% detailed, so running a dovetailer is not necessary. Probabilistic predictions are just fine too. So for any class of system (presumably containing our world to be of interest), there will be some properties that remain constant, or will change in predictable (ie mechanistic or computable) ways. Mostly we have just a model (physicist's model, not logician's) to work with - which of course brings to light the problem of induction that the model needn't be faithful to the system being modelled. > > To get a special physicalness or a physical universe, capable of > selecting some special computations on all computations which go > through the actual state of the guy doing the physical test, you > need to invoke some non-computable element, different from the > statistics on all computations, (which, as I just said, is not > computable). > None of this is required to get predictive power. Models needn't have any ontological status - the vast majority of physical model are _known_ not to have ontological status. > Now, the probability distribution might be computable, or the logic > of the "certain events" might be axiomatisable, and indeed, is (by > S4Grz1; Z1* and X1*). > > > > >Particularly when the > >whole induction process is explained quite neatly with the > >Solomonoff-Levin universal prior and Bayes theorem over a multiversal > >set of events that naturally arises in the context of > >computationalism. > > Unless the universal prior is based on the assumption of a unique > physical reality, that makes my point. ? > If you derive the multiversal > set of events from computationalism, physicalism needs to add > something which has no role at all, from the computationalist > perspective, and yet has to have some role to not contradict the > "yes" doctor, or it has to bring some strange actions from some > object having no interaction with a machine (like in the movie graph > or Olympia). We seemed to have diverged from predictive power of physics to physicalism? Why? ... rest snipped as it is along the same digression ... -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
