On 23 Apr 2017, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 10:32 AM, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
On 23/04/2017 6:18 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 12:42 AM, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
>
wrote:
On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim
that
there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a
"soul")
that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is
this:
under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The
problem is
that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction. Can spell out
what
that
contradiction is?
Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space.
Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth
but also
in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the
simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as
unique. It
follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In
fact,
you
examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that
any
computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal
Dovetailer
running
on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
physical
concept.
Sure, how could I show a contradiction without assuming both
computationalism and physicalism?
Do you disagree that my argument shows that a computationalist mind
cannot be spatially or temporally situated?
Of course I disagree. Your argument requires that all the
computations be
physically instantiated. SO even if there are many instantiations,
each and
every one is spatially and temporally situated.
Yes, but there is no relationship between these instantiations and the
properties of my mind. You can change when or where you run these
computations and it doesn't matter.
What you are proposing is a magic step: that a computationalism mind
can only exist if the invocation is performed at least once (but it
doesn't matter how many times) on some physical substrate (but it
doesn't matter when or where).
If you don't, do you disagree that something that is not spatially
or
temporally situated is incompatible with physicalism?
I certainly disagree because you have confused "having many
locations" with
"having no location".
No, you have confused "having many locations" from "being independent
from location".
Many things are not physical, but are properties of,
or manifested by, physical objects or beings.
If you start by assuming physicalism. If your position is "physicalism
is obviously true, get over it", then there's no point in debating.
Values such as justice and
mercy are not physical, but are exhibited, or not, by physical
beings.
Yes, they are abstractions. Abstractions are constructs of the mind.
We all agree that mind can conceive of non-physical things, but what
is mind? If you already take it as self-evident that the mind is
physical, then what are we discussing?
Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You
have to
add
something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea
that all
computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
physical
implementation. But that is merely the assumption that
physicalism is
false.
So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
require a
physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
perfectly
possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
mathematical
platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive physical
universe
and
that any actual computations require a physical substrate -- as
JC keeps
insisting.
The scenario you propose would require the following:
- my mind supervenes on computation C;
- my mind exists if computation C is performed by at least one
physical substrate P;
- if the computation C is performed by several physical substrates
P1,
P2, P3, nothing changes, my mind still exists as unique;
Suppose one of the physical realities, say P1, is what you call
primitive and C is running on P1. You would say I am experiencing
the
primitive universe. But then P2 (the giant Jupiter computer) also
starts running the computation. In fact, at some point, the real
earth
is destroyed but P2 continues.
So, if the physical substrate you propose exists, there is no way of
knowing if that is the physical reality that my mind perceives.
There
is no way that I can access it or verify it's existence.
This seems to be nothing more than the universality of Turing
computation --
it is the same computation whatever computer it is run on. But that
does not
prove that there is no computer. Your simulation ideas are just the
hypothesis that the program is more complicated than you first
thought,
And also that it doesn't matter when or where or how many times the
computation is run on the "primary universe". So our reality is, for
all intents and purposes, independent from the physical substrate --
except to the degree that it must run the computation at least once!
it
does not change the fact that your consciousness is a computation
running on
a physical computer.
Or many. Of infinite. But not zero. This is what you're proposing.
We never have access to "ultimate truth". The best we can ever
achieve is a
model or theort=y that accords with every aspect of the reality we
experience. That is known as science.
In my view,
what you are proposing is not different than positing that an
invisible spaghetti monster lives in the orbit of Mars. I cannot
prove
that it's false, but it is not a scientific theory.
JC's argument that he has never seen a computation run without a
computational substrate is silly when assuming comp, because
assuming
comp JC never perceived *anything but* the inside of a computation.
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a
physical
computer.
Indeed. It is also impossible to prove that an invisible dragon that
cannot be touched, smelled or heard, does not live in my kitchen.
I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of the
abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of
physical
computers, and non of non-physical computers.
I have experience of rocks, but not quanta.
(Whatever you say to the
contrary, our brain is a physical computer, and our thoughts
supervene on
this brain.)
Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :).
That is far better than saying the even shorter "consciousness is
computation", which identifies something 1p and something 3p.
My current favorite short rendering of computationalism is that
consciousness is invariant for a recursive permutation of the brain at
some level of description.
No problem here, you make well the point, I think.
Bruno
You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.
I know of no proof on wether comp is true or not. Unless you have one,
I think you should remain agnostic on this.
Telmo.
Bruce
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