On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 10:16 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
> Legalese my ass. If you claim to have a scientific theory you should be >> able >> > to clearly explain it without circularity and do it with AT LEAST as >> little >> > ambiguity as a lawyer can argue his case at the Supreme Court. The >> entire >> > point of Bruno's paper is to explore the relationship between the >> > first-person experience and the third-person, and yet on page 1 he >> already >> > throws around a word like "you" as if the matter has already been >> settled, >> > even when "you" is about to walk into a "you" duplicating machine. >> Bruno is >> > starting with the very thing he's trying to prove, from page 1 line 1 >> Bruno >> > is assuming the "you" duplicating machine can't really duplicate >> EVERYTHING >> > about "you" only some of the things. > > > > > My understanding of Bruno's article is that he is proving the > > following: IF > > computationalism is true, THEN physicalism is false. > It doesn't matter what Bruno is trying to prove, if "you" is about to walk into a "you" duplicating machine then the question "after you walk into a you duplicating machine what one and only one city will you end up seeing?" is just a stupid question. > > > Computationalism: the hypothesis that mind is a computation; > Yes , and I think Computationalism is true. > > if computationalism is true then matter supervenes on mind, and not the > other way around. > I don't know what you're talking about, "s upervenes" is just a very pompous word for "occurs later". Computations need matter, so if computationalism is true then matter had to come before mind. > > > Physicalism: the hypothesis that everything (including mind) > > supervenes on physical matter. > That depends entirely on what occurs later on physical matter means. I do know that Physicalism means the real world is the physical world; and "the real world" is the stuff that will continue to exist even if I don't believe in it. Physicalism is probably true because the moon will probably continue to exist even when I'm not thinking about it. > > > We don't know if computationalism is true > . > Oh I think we do know it's true, or at least we do if mind is equivalent to intelligence. Nobody will ever be able to prove or disprove if computationalism (or any other theory) is true for consciousness too, but I'm just going to assume it is true because I could not function if I really believed I was the only conscious being in the universe. > > > Ambiguity around personal identity, for the purpose of this proof > [...] > I'll say it again, it doesn't matter what the purpose is, in a proof or even a coherent sentence a ambiguous term can't be used with the expectation of proving something. And tell me Telmo , why do you suppose Bruno absolutely refuses to stop using personal pronouns despite me complaining about it for years; if he's really onto something why doesn't he shut me down simply by using the referent instead of the pronoun? Because then there would be no place to hide the logical flaws of the theory. And by the way, asking what city "*THE* 1-p" will see is just as stupid a question if *THE* 1-p is about to walk into a 1-p duplicating machine. > > [...] > is > > removed with the device of the diaries. Tell me how. You wrote the diary and the person who wrote the diary has the name "you", but two people walked out of that machine and then they diverged as soon as they saw different cities, which one wrote the diary? And that's not even the worst problem. Personal identity is established with memory and looking back into the past, not by looking forward with expectations of the future. I subjectively feel that I am John Clark of yesterday because I remember being him yesterday; I have expectations of what tomorrow will be like but my expectations could be wrong, they often are, but I'll still feel like John Clark if I can remember being John Clark today. > > > Bruno never suggests that, at the moment of duplication, there is > > anything that is not copied. Then why is one something called "the 3p you" and the other is "the 1p you"? > > > The differences start when the copies are exposed > > to different environments, I agree. So who is the Moscow man? The man who saw Moscow. Who is the Washington man? The man who saw Washington. Who is the Helsinki man? The man who saw Helsinki. Is the Moscow man the Helsinki man? Yes. Is the Washington man the Helsinki man? Yes. Is the Moscow man the Washington man? No. > > > 1-p is the first person perspective of reality. And that's the problem right there. In a world that contains 1-p duplicating machines why on earth did you use the word "the"? When 2 people walk out of that machine which one has " *the* first person perspective of reality "? > > >> Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p you" that >> >> can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a euphemism for >> "soul". > > > > > If you don't know what > > this is, then you're either a zombie or you're truly crazy. I'm not a zombie and I'm not crazy and I do know what "you" means, the trouble is the guy who looks just like me and walked out of the you duplicating machine at the same time I did is also not a zombie is not crazy and has as clear a understanding of what "you" means as I do . So which ONE of us has "*THE* 1-p you"? > > > Forget Bruno. Have you read Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"? Not in the original Greek. but this is a well-defined though experiment. Does it go wrong > > somewhere? No. So what? > > > Another 10 minutes wasted. > Perhaps your time would have been better spent looking for that mysterious post of Bruno's that I've been hearing about for years, the one I somehow never saw that proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that I am wrong. I really want to see that post, it's legendary! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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