On 26 Apr 2017, at 20:26, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/26/2017 12:32 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 25 Apr 2017 11:07 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 4/25/2017 1:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 25 Apr 2017 5:15 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 4/24/2017 10:02 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
I don't think there's any question that non-physical things
exist, like chess and insurance and computations. The question
was whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a
mind, i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a
contradiction of something. The "something" having to do with
physics, is part of what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it
reverses the relationship of physics and psychology...but that's
more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction.
I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as
a hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no
more than the natural numbers with + and * this amounts to an
ontology of arithmetic. Platonism be damned, our interest at this
point is merely in seeing where the hypothesis can take us. So,
computationalism leads us to the extension of the UD, which in
turn gives us the digital machine, aka the fully fungible
universal computational device. The reversal then is between role
of the "psychology" of that universal machine and the subset of
the trace of the UD assumed to implement physics.
The UD doesn't have a "psychology". Bruno talks about the
"beliefs" of a universal theorem prover in arithmetic...but that's
not a UD. And was is "the trace of the UD".
Are you kidding? How long have we all been discussing all this?
To talk of taking a "subset of the trace" sounds to me like
handing waving: We'll make a machine that writes all possible
sentences and then there's a subset that describes the world.
Ok, so now you know what it is. The point is just that comp is
true then it exists. If not it doesn't. We've been discussing the
consequences of the former case. If you still want to believe in
the necessity of a physical computer, we only have to accept that
comp would be true in the presence of any such computer capable of
running the UD.
The former is now required to play the role of filter or selector
on behalf of the latter; it's what distinguishes it from the
much more general computational background. Of course that
"filtration", by assumption, essentially equates to the extremely
high probability of that very subset being required to support
its own self-selection.
Are you saying this "subset of the trace" must have a high
probability of existing, or it has, by some measure, a high
probability relative to other stuff not in the trace. If the
latter, and if the measure can be defined, that would be an
interesting result; but when I've asked about this in the past
Bruno has just said it's a hoped for result.
I'm glad you agree it would be interesting.
I understand that Bruno wants to take thoughts as fundamental and
the wants to identify thoughts with provable or computable
propositions in arithmetic. He thinks that the modality of
"provable" is somehow a good model of "believes" or "thinks". But
even if that were true (I don't think it is) it fails to account
for the physical world which one thinks about and acts in.
IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of "universal
point of view" falling to the suitably programmed digital
machine. It from bit really, but without the prior commitment to
physics as the unexplained (aka primitive) assumption. OK?
You don't seem to have even mentioned a contradiction.
You didn't ask about the contradiction. You asked about the
reversal. Are you clearer on what is meant by that now? I'm not
asking if you believe it, just can we agree what is meant?
I did ask about the contradiction. From above: "The question was
whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind,
i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction
of something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part
of what I would like eulicidated." So, no I'm not clear what the
reversal means. It is claimed to contradict the idea that matter
is in some sense fundamental, e.g. Democritus "Nothing exists
except atoms and the void; all else is opinion." But in my view
ontology is theory dependent, i.e. you find a theory that works
well as an explanation and a predictor and then that theory
provides an ontology: the POVI (intersubjective observable)
elements of the theory. So I'm not clear on what is the reversal.
The function of bodies, including brains, is, we think, within the
scope of physics. Is this "reversed"...to what exactly?
Ok, I see that this is an important misunderstanding. If physics is
taken to be the fundamental science, in the sense that a completed
physics will not demand further explanation, then consciousness
will clearly have to be explained entirely on the basis of that
fundamental science. For example, you yourself have said that you
believe the controversy will be settled by a completed neuroscience.
That's slightly different than what I said. I pointed out that
Newton's theory of gravity did not explain gravity, and neither does
Einstein's. When we have a theory that is effective, i.e. makes
only accurate and even surprising predictions, when then think of it
as "explaining" the phenomena. But this "explanation" is not at all
like the explanation that was sought before the instrumentally
successful theory. This is exemplified in the case of Newton:
people wanted an explanation of the the gravitational force - not
just a formula to calculate it - and Newton answered, "Hyposthesi
non fingo."
So my expectation is that cognitive science will go the same way.
When we have learned to make AI robots to behave as conscious people
behave, the "hard problem of consciousness" will be seen to have
been the wrong question - like "What causes the force of gravity?"
Mystics will still ponder it and it will still be controversial
among metaphysicians.
But with computationalism, metaphysics can be approached with the
scientific attitude, and we did come with a theory capable of
explaining both consciousness and what causes the force of gravity,
and to test it.
By contrast, if comp is to be assumed in the fundamental role, then
the emergence of the universal machine will then *precede* that of
physics.
I assume you mean "precede" in some explanatory, not temporal,
sense. But I don't think explanations are necessarily hierarchical
with a bottom; I think they are better thought of as circular. If
they bottom out anywhere, it is ostensively.
PA is circular, but plays the rôle of the observer. But RA is not
circular, and is both necessary and sufficient for an effective
"bottom".
What Bruno is at pains to show is then that the machine possesses a
"point of view", aka its psychology, in terms of which physics will
emerge as a complex of inter-subjective appearances (just as you,
Bruce and indeed Bruno and I require). Note by the way that this
immediately establishes in principle the elusive interior/exterior
distinction. It would also have to be the case, if comp is indeed
to succeed, that the computations corresponding to those physical
appearances would themselves typify (massively) those supporting
human level subjectivity. So in this way sentient entities would
"select" the very physical environments necessary for
their own existence.
But that seems to a chauvinistic view of the situtation. One could
as well say the physical environment selected the creatures that can
exist in it. But whichever way you look at it, it doesn't look to
me like a contradiction between the computational theory of mind and
physics.
If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it
drives the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that?
If it does it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because
that is done in arithmetic too). If it does it in a non digital way,
how could I trust the doctor anymore?
Bruno
Brent
Of course the foregoing is not proven but it's implied by comp and
it hasn't been disproved either. Anyway, in a nutshell, that's the
reversal (i.e of explanatory priority) between physics and machine
psychology.
David
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
