On 28 Apr 2017, at 20:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/28/2017 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Apr 2017, at 18:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how
it drives the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it
do that? If it does it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot
work (because that is done in arithmetic too)
We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction
between physics and arithmetic.
I think you need to be more precise. The contradiction is not
between physics and arithmetic, but between computationalism and
physicalism.
But those are not contradictory, they are contrary.
It is enough to get the epistemological contradiction.
Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital
thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.
Just reread the quote above. Or reread may old posts where I say
the exact contrary of what you say here. If computationalism is
true, then physics cannot be an illusion of digital thought: on the
contrary it has to be precisely a sum on an infinity of digital
illusion/histories,
I don't see how "an infinity of digital illusion/histories" can be
"summed" - it sounds more like a poetic metaphor, which is very far
from "precise".
That is certainly the case,, and that is why I use the self-
referential logics to make it precise. But it can be understood
intuitively: it is only the passage from step 6, where the
reconstitution domain is finite, to the infinite domain. Then using
the fact that the measure is on the distinguishable first person
experiences, the domain becomes finite again, and the only difficulty
is in justifying reasonable weightings, and the self-referential
logics shows how to proceed in a manner which keep the truth/proof
distinction all along (useful to get the quanta/qualia).
which is hardly emulable by a digital computer, but is the
indeterminate experience on all relative continuations thanks to
the fact that the first person is unaware of the delays made by the
UD in arithmetic.
But thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well you
just don't see how it could be.
Not at all. It *cannot* be. You need magic to single out anything
capable to select the computations better than the indeterminate
experience on all relative continuations.
That sounds like magic to me. What is "the indeterminate experience
on all relative continuations"
It is the experience done by self-duplicating finite entities, like in
the WM-duplication. In the iterated case, it is all experiences of
binary sequences. It is equivalent to a random oracle. With the UD,
alias the sigma-1 sentences, it far more complex, and that is why I
interview directly the machine on this.
and how is it "capable to select the computations"?
That is what computationalism explains the best. Once the door of the
reconstitution-box is open, the computer in the skull of the
reconstituted person will do the differentiation, and reflect the
local neighborhood. You did understood this sometimes ago, so I am not
sure what you point at here.
When you say "it cannot be" you are already assuming your reductio
argument is correct and that you have selected the right premise to
reject - THEN it follows that it "cannot be".
Yes, I keep the computationalist hypothesis, as it is my working
hypothesis, and we did not came up with a contradiction. I am not
concluding that computationalism is true of course.
The problem is not with physics, but with physicalism.
But physicalism (which is what - material is fundamental?) was not a
premise of your reductio.
It is, in step 8, or equivalent. The point remains: how could a god,
or a "real" physical universe select the computations among the
infinity which are emulated in (all) models of arithmetic?
Even with non-computationalism, I am not sure such a physical reality
makes sense, but with computaionalism, it needs magic. By magic I
means anything which either non-Turing emulable, or non-FPI-recoverable.
Bruno
Brent
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