On 26 April 2017 at 09:22, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 4/25/2017 6:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 5:58 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >>>> Suppose just for >>>> the sake of argument that non-physical computations did not exist, >>>> how would our physical world be different? There would be no difference. >>>> Therefore either >>>> non-physical computations >>>> do not exist or they do but are utterly unimportant, rather like the >>>> l >>>> uminiferous aether >>>> . >>>> >>> >>> > >>> This is equivalent to supposing that mathematical Platonism is false. >>> >> >> >> Not exactly. Einstein didn't prove the >> >> luminiferous aether >> >> didn't exist in the Platonic sense, he just proved it was unimportant. I >> suppose you could say in the vague way that Greek philosophers love that >> correct mathematical calculations exist independently of matter, but the >> trouble is incorrect mathematical calculations exist too, and the only way >> to differentiate the correct from the incorrect is by using matter that >> obeys the laws of physics. And separating the stuff we want from the stuff >> we don't is important, that's why we say Michelangelo's huge statue of >> David is 500 years old and not far older even though in the platonic sense >> David was inside a gigantic block of Carrara marble >> >> for 100 million years and all >> >> Michelangelo >> >> did was unpack it, he just removed the parts of the block that weren't >> David. >> > > But if the statue were conscious and it's consciousness not dependent on > interaction with the outside world, it would still be conscious inside the > marble block. > > Any physical object could be viewed as implementing a computation as > anything could be mapped onto of a Turing machine, but the "work" of the > computation would then be not in the physical object but in the mapping, a > Platonic object. The problem with this is that such an implementation > cannot interact with its environment, so you cannot, as you say to Bruno, > use it to make money hiring out your Platonic computer. But what if we > consider conscious computation that does not interact with the environment > of its implementation? Like the statue in the block of marble, it would > still be conscious even if no-one outside could appreciate it or make money > out of it. > > > I think this is specious. Even humans who, as in sensory deprivation > tanks, have no interaction with their environment tend to "lose > consciousness" in the sense of going into though loops. If a brain were > truly, completely isolated from it's environment I think it very doubtful > that it could remain conscious. And if, like David in the block, had never > experienced an environment it would be hard to say what he could be > conscious OF. The computation in our brains takes it's "meaning" from our > interactions with the world. > When we are dreaming we are not aware of the external environment. In any case, the effect of sensory deprivation on humans is a contingent fact about human psychology, and I don't think it implies anything about the nature of consciousness in general. The question of where computations in our brains get their meaning from is interesting. As we develop, certain brain patterns come to be associated with certain patterns in the environment, and hence acquire meaning. The brain pattern and associated meaning can later be summoned in the absence of the environmental stimulus, as in a thought or a dream. But if the same brain with the same brain patterns were created de novo, say with an advanced 3D printer, would the meaning be absent? I find it difficult to imagine how that could be the case. > > The idea that computationalism implies that consciousness would occur > independently of physical activity has been used as an argument against > computationalism, on the grounds that it is self-evidently absurd. Hilary > Putnam, originator of functionalism (of which computationalism is a > subset), later realised this implication and changed his mind. John Searle > and Tim Maudlin came to a similar conclusion. > > But an alternative is, as Bruno suggests, to keep computationalism and > accept that the apparent physical world is secondary, not primary. The > physical computers sold by Dell or IBM, along with everything else, are > made in a virtual reality running on a Platonic computer. While this may at > first glance seem absurd, there is no reason I can think of why it cannot > be true. And it has advantages in addition to preserving computationalism, > such as eliminating the need to explain why there should be a physical > universe at all. > > > But it doesn't eliminate the need to explain why there should be a > physical universe - rather it speculates that the UD will necessarily > produce not only thread of consciouness but also a physics for > consciousness to relate to. But that's why I thing the "reversal" is a > cheat. The physics is necessary to the consciousness - whatever is > "primary". > Mathematics is ontologically necessary: God is not needed to create the number 2 and can't get rid of the number 2 even if he is omnipotent. Primary physical existence lacks this quality of ontological necessity. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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