On Mon, May 1, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​
>> You said you could never experience 2 things at the same
>> ​
>> time, I gave a example of a way that you could.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Yes, by giving the 3-1 view,
>

​I don't know what that means. I do know that I give a example of how in
the future you the Helsinki man world remember being you the Helsinki man
​and in addition remember doing things in Moscow and Washington at exactly
the same time; I don't know how many peas that is in your homemade
notation, but it's the only viewpoint of interest.


> ​> ​
> but that was not what was asked.
>

​The trouble is nobody knows what was asked, least of all Bruno Marchal.​


​>> ​
>> If my
>> ​
>> example is wrong and there is a asymmetry then either
>> ​
>> the Washington man or the Moscow man is not you
>
>
> ​> ​
> Wrong. Both are me,
>

​Then obviously asking "what one and only one city will I see?" is not
indeterminate, it's just silly. ​



> ​> but ​
> both lives not being the other one,
>

​Yes, as I've saying for years the Washington man is not the Moscow man
because neither remembers being the other, but both are the Helsinki man
because both remember being him. And indeterminacy has nothing to do with
it.  ​


​>>​
>> I want to know which one;
>
>

​>​
> Both
>

​Then there is no indeterminacy because you just made a correct prediction
to the question "what city will the Helsinki ​man see?", and that correct
prediction is "both".


>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> It
>>> ​[​
>>> the 1-view  from the 3p view
>>> ​]
>>> is when a third party attribute a mind to other people than one self.
>>
>>

​>> ​
>> If the attribution of other minds is mistaken then you live among
>> zombies,
>
>
> ​> ​
> It is not mistaken.
>

​If so then the existence of ​"
the 1-view  from the 3p view
​" implies the existence of a "1-view" and therefore it ​is silly to invent
a new term even more convoluted than the old homemade term.


> ​> ​
> In fact, by definition of comp,
>

​"Comp" has no consistent definition, at least none that I've seen on this
list.
​The ideas behind ​
Computationalism
​ are crystal clear, but ​not for your homemade baby talk word "comp".

​>> ​
>> If by "H-BM" you mean the Bruno Marchal that is currently seeing Helsinki
>> then in the future H-BM will see oblivion because in the future no Bruno
>> Marchal is seeing Helsinki. That would be a rather odd way of looking at it
>> because it would also mean that the Bruno Marchal who wrote a post
>> yesterday that I am responding to today is dead because today Bruno Marchal
>> is not currently experiencing yesterday.
>> ​
>> But, as makes more sense, if by "H-BM" you mean the Bruno Marchal who
>> remembers seeing Helsinki and being H-BM then H-BM will see BOTH cities
>> because they both remember seeing the city and being him.  Tell me which of
>> those two things "H-BM" means and I'll tell you what if anything he will
>> see.
>
>
> ​> ​
> We have already agreed that the H-BM survives in both place,
>

​Yes but who exactly is H-BM? I think it's the BM who remembers being in
Helsinki. What do you think?  ​

>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> after all the Helsinki man doesn't become W-BM and then see W, instead
>>> he sees W and that experience turns him into W-BM.
>>> ​
>>>  Exactly, that makes the point. You do understand.
>>
>>

​>> ​
>> Yes, I understand there is no indeterminacy.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That has been refuted.
>

​
Of course it has been refuted,
​
in that mythical unicorn post of your's that you've been talking about for
years that nobody has ever seen.

 John K Clark

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