On 02 May 2017, at 03:07, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 1, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> You said you could never experience 2 things at the same
time, I gave a example of a way that you could.
> Yes, by giving the 3-1 view,
I don't know what that means. I do know that I give a example of
how in the future you the Helsinki man world remember being you the
Helsinki man and in addition remember doing things in Moscow and
Washington at exactly the same time;
That never happens in any 1-views obtained directly after the
duplication. Reintroducing the symmetry later by fusing mind (assuming
this can make sense) witness that you have seen the asymmetry.
I don't know how many peas that is in your homemade notation, but
it's the only viewpoint of interest.
> but that was not what was asked.
The trouble is nobody knows what was asked, least of all Bruno
Marchal.
>> If my example is wrong and there is a asymmetry then
either the Washington man or the Moscow man is not you
> Wrong. Both are me,
Then obviously asking "what one and only one city will I see?" is
not indeterminate, it's just silly.
> but both lives not being the other one,
Yes, as I've saying for years the Washington man is not the Moscow
man because neither remembers being the other, but both are the
Helsinki man because both remember being him. And indeterminacy has
nothing to do with it.
>>I want to know which one;
>Both
Then there is no indeterminacy because you just made a correct
prediction to the question "what city will the Helsinki man see?",
and that correct prediction is "both".
That is the problem: with computationalism, a third party can say
"both", but obviously, the first person obtained can see only one
city, leading to the first person indeterminacy.
The math proof is independent, you might search for Benacerraf in the
archive. It is a theorem that a machine cannot know which computation
support her in arithmetic, and if you think the contrary, you might
try to explain your algorithm.
>>> It [the 1-view from the 3p view] is when a
third party attribute a mind to other people than one self.
>> If the attribution of other minds is mistaken then you live
among zombies,
> It is not mistaken.
If so then the existence of "the 1-view from the 3p view"
implies the existence of a "1-view" and therefore it is silly to
invent a new term even more convoluted than the old homemade term.
A implies B does not mean that A is equivalent to B.
> In fact, by definition of comp,
"Comp" has no consistent definition, at least none that I've seen
on this list. The ideas behind Computationalism are crystal
clear, but not for your homemade baby talk word "comp".
comp implies all other form of computationalism. If you know a version
of comp which has no first person indeterminacy, then give it to us.
>> If by "H-BM" you mean the Bruno Marchal that is currently
seeing Helsinki then in the future H-BM will see oblivion because in
the future no Bruno Marchal is seeing Helsinki. That would be a
rather odd way of looking at it because it would also mean that the
Bruno Marchal who wrote a post yesterday that I am responding to
today is dead because today Bruno Marchal is not currently
experiencing yesterday. But, as makes more sense, if by "H-BM" you
mean the Bruno Marchal who remembers seeing Helsinki and being H-BM
then H-BM will see BOTH cities because they both remember seeing the
city and being him. Tell me which of those two things "H-BM" means
and I'll tell you what if anything he will see.
> We have already agreed that the H-BM survives in both place,
Yes but who exactly is H-BM? I think it's the BM who remembers
being in Helsinki. What do you think?
We have agreed on this since the start, so why do you ask? And so both
remembers that they were the guy in H, and so, none can abstract from
the one bit of info they each got after the duplication, which
justifies simply, in a crystal clear way, the first person
indeterminacy lived and experienced by the H-guy. To avoid this, you
need to eliminate the first person discourse of both copies.
Bruno
>>> after all the Helsinki man doesn't become W-BM and then
see W, instead he sees W and that experience turns him into W-BM.
Exactly, that makes the point. You do understand.
>> Yes, I understand there is no indeterminacy.
> That has been refuted.
Of course it has been refuted, in that mythical unicorn post of
your's that you've been talking about for years that nobody has ever
seen.
John K Clark
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