On 05 May 2017, at 21:04, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/5/2017 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 May 2017, at 22:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/4/2017 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 May 2017, at 23:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/3/2017 1:48 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Depends on what you mean by comp. You seem to engage in the
same equivocation as Bruno. On the one hand it means saying
"yes" to the doctor. On the other hand it means accepting his
whole argument from that purportedly proving that physics is
otiose. So then the argument refers to itself and says if
physics is otiose then the physics we observe must be that
predicted by his theory.
That's not it.. the thing is if *mind* is a computational
object, then physics must be explained through computation,
computations are not physical object... If physicalness is
primary, then there aren't any computation, computations in a
physically primary reality are only a "human view" on what is
really going on.
This an extreme reductionist view, i.e. if X is the fundamental
ontology then only X exists. But that leads to nonsense: "If
the standard model is fundamental ontology then football
doesn't exist." And it has the same affect of Bruno's theory:
"If the basic ontology is computations then neither physics nor
football exist."
It's not nonsense it's just the unvarnished consequence of the
assumptions​. If the basic ontology is computation then both
physics and football are shared epistemological constructions
supervening on computation. Otherwise there's just computation
and none the worse for that. But in any case I've been trying
to persuade you to accept that football, for example, must be
such a construction even on a purely physical basis.
Where I balk is at the "must". It's "must if Bruno's theory is
right", but that's the question. If you interpret "exist" to
apply only to the elements of the fundamental ontology, then in
computationalism all that exists are the natural numbers, +, and
* -- consciousness is as emergent as football. But semantics
aside, a theory needs to predict things. What does Bruno's
theory predict about consciousness:
Your beliefs are closed under logical inference,
That is the case only for the ideally correct machine that we
need to extract physics. As a theory of human's belief, or any
concrete agent's belief, it is not reasonable. But theology and
physics is not human psychology, nor AI.
The prediction of comp? There is a physical reality, structured
quantum logically by a statistics on many interfering computation
and their internal povs.
It is only "quantum logically" in the sense of modeling
uncertainty - which is a very weak prediction. It doesn't so far
as can tell imply Hilbert space or projectors or complex numbers.
If you could get to Hilbert space you might invoke Gleason's
theorem, but I don't think Gleason's theorem applies to a space
over C.
It explains qualia, where physics fails. UDA = physics fails on the
mind-body problem.
It's not so clear to me that physics fails. I think it is like the
elan vital, people are looking for an explanation in terms that
maintain a mystery they enjoy.
Yes, primary matter is like the elan vital. It makes everything
mysterious.
In my terms an explanation of a phenomenon tells you how to create
and change and use it. That's why I think the engineering of AI
will dissolve the "hard problem".
That is like moving the interest in fundamental question to
application. You might be right. this happens even with quantum
computing, once a mystery get applications, we get used to it, and we
can forget the mystery. But that does not solve the problem, on the
contrary, it consists in to put the problem under the rug of the
habits. It is lifting the non solved human-mind-body problem to "and
we will not try to solve it for the machine too".
Mechanism? Not yet, and we get a quantum logic where physics must
appear.
What quantum logic? Birkhoff's
Yes. Birkhoff-von Neuman, modulo the credibility nuances.
So Mechanism explains both qualia and quanta. Not at the point to
replace physics, but that is not the goal.
What do you mean by "Gleason theorem would not apply to a space
over C"? If the quantum logic obeys some conditions, it will apply.
Unfortunately, we need to optimize the G* theorem prover to progress.
My mistake. I changed what I intended to write in midsentence and
didn't change the sentence to match. I meant that Gleason's theorem
would not go through unless the Hilbert space was over a continuous
valued field.
No problem with this. the continuous is natural for the semantic of
the "& p" modalities.
i.e. everything that follows from and subset of your beliefs is
also believed. Is that true?...I doubt it.
Your thinking about arithmetic is unaffected by tequila?...not
for me.
My looking at the sky is also affected by tequila, but that does
not mean that the sky is a product of my brain.
Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic,
according to your theory of consciousness, is independent of
perception and physics. Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed
by arithmetic and so should be independent of tequila.
That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a
machine drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything.
That would be impressive. Is this proof published?
It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all computational
histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be short. In the
simulation of tequila + brain, people get drunk.
You may object that you were only considering the ideal machine, a
perfect reasoner, but in that case you are equivocating because
you imply that the results of interviewing that ideal machine tell
us about consciousness as we experience it.
About physics.
Physics depends on intersubjective agreement, so you would need to
interview persons - not just one ideal machine.
That is what I do right now, but to get the physics, it is infinitely
more efficacious to interview the correct one.
No need to interview the many silly machines which lives in
arithmetic, when we search for the correct physics. Would you
refute Einstein relativity because he asks us to imagine people
walking in a train, and forget to mention he assumes the sobriety
of that walker?
I would be skeptical if he just asked one person who had walked on a
train.
Me too. This is normally handled by the []p and the []p & <>t. Only
the "& p" makes thinbgs not sharable. But technically, for physics,
the "& p" is needed, and this gives the first person plural nature of
the physical reality, making us entering the same duplication box (it
makes the superposition contagious), and this should help to isolate
the tensor products, but the math is note easy. Nobody said it should
be.
Bruno
Brent
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