On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 5/6/2017 12:59 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 May 2017 8:08 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic, according to >>>> your theory of consciousness, is independent of perception and physics. >>>> Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed by arithmetic and so should be >>>> independent of tequila. >>>> >>> >>> That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a machine >>> drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything. >>> >> >> That would be impressive. Is this proof published? >> > > It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all computational > histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be short. In the simulation of > tequila + brain, people get drunk. > That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts it because it predicts "everything", including people drink tequila and don't get drunk. Yes, but the key is the measure, isn't it. Everett also predicts that everything consistent with QM happens. Somehow this leads to a probabilistic account of what to expect. We know the math but we don't know the reason. You're no doubt bored with my banging on about Hoyle, but I must say that his is so far the only metaphor that has ever conveyed to me how something could be both certain and uncertain depending on one's point of view. So I think it's far too tricksy to say that comp predicts everything (or Everett, or eternal inflation for that matter). The key is the measure and how that measure discriminates between the typical, the unusual, and the downright weird. Open problem, sure, but hardly an empty or pointless one. But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive success. QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol molecules in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and THEN invoking the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind supervenes on material events, it predicts that your ability to do arithmetic will be impaired by drinking tequila. It will NOT predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal probability. So it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure problem. Without having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say. I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its predominating computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively self-selected by complex subjects, in this case, like ourselves) is the physics those selfsame subjects observe, That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post Bruno says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it). But to succeed in prediction it is not enough to show that some world exists in which mind and physics are consistent (that the physics that mind infers is also the real physics that predicts effects on the mind). You need also to show this has large measure relative to contrary worlds. One can make a logic chopping argument that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be making sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the whole computational argument otiose. I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment. Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting). Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in their effective environment. Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the generator of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely reiterative​ and hence very robust (both in the sense of computational inclusiveness a la step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who is to say that the generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't equally or even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such library is bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated here). Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here, such that internally consistent computations self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel? Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking, there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine), inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever particularly appreciated. So this is all very general and no doubt hand-wavy, but it's what occurred to me today whilst reflecting on our present discussion from the perspective of a sunny cafe on the Sicilian coast (sad, isn't it?). David That's how it is similar to the Boltzmann brain problem. I think Sean Carroll has solved the Boltzmann brain problem, but there is still some controversy. then it must fail. In effect, at that point we would have arrived at a notion of computation that did indeed appear to supervene on objects in the effective physical environment, albeit qua computatio, as Bruno was wont to say. Hence if the physical brain got plastered, so would the mind apparently supervening on it. That's true in this world...one among infinitely many. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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