On 2 June 2017 at 14:34, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au > > > > wrote: > >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: > >>> > >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >>>> > >>>> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. > >>>> > >>>>> For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR > >>>>> "paradox", > >>>>> and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging > to > >>>>> macrosuperposition. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without > >>>> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were > >>>> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's > >>>> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and > >>>> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in > >>>> any other interpretation. > >>>> > >>>> Bruce > >>> > >>> > >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is > no > >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where > >>> somehow > >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. > The > >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the > >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even > when > >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything > that's > >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in > the > >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's > consciousness > >>> is > >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in > >>> his > >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). > >> > >> > >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when > this > >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: > >> > >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of > QM. > >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question > of > >> non-locality in QM. > >> > >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an > undisguised > >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered > >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in > favour > >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain > > > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > > > > Hi David, > > > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I > recently > > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be > demonstrated > > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no > lack > > of experimental evidence. > > I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I > disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what > one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me > anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I > can't remember". > > Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known > phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain > activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember > dreaming. > > These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple > meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden > assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the > light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > Sure, but I don't see that anything you've said above is inconsistent with any particular state of consciousness supervening, in the simple sense of covariance stated above, with neurological function to any arbitrary level of detail. Nor for that matter would it be necessary to deny this whatever one's preferred theory of consciousness might ultimately be (e.g. computationalism). > > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous > > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question > of > > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as > > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less > obvious > > and more controversial. > > I would say that it depends more on what one is willing to count as > evidence. Well, what would count as evidence is intimately linked to what would count as explanation, since what is selected in the first instance as data is closely dependent on the dictates of theory. Indirect measures of consciousness entail hidden > assumptions, and it becomes easy to beg the question. > Which particular question did you have in mind? David > > Telmo. > > > David > > > > In my opinion this results from equating intelligence and human > > experience with consciousness. Maybe that position is correct, but > > nobody can claim to know if this is the case. > > > > There is overwhelming evidence that the physical brain is a computer, > > capable of storing memories, detecting patterns, predicting the future > > and so on. It is also the case that human experience depends on these > > mechanisms. What there is no evidence for is what is conscious or not. > > > > For example, panpsychists hold that everything is conscious. I don't > > see how such a hypothesis can be falsified at the moment. > > > > Telmo. > > > >> -- they move in > >> lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular > >> measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness > >> are > >> conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of > >> indiscernibles, > >> there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and > MWI > >> tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. > >> > >> Bruce > >> > >> > >> > >>> The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such > >>> assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do. > >>> > >>> Saibal > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > >> "Everything List" group. > >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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