On 2 Jun 2017 22:32, "Telmo Menezes" <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 5:53 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 2 June 2017 at 14:34, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: >> > >> > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett >> > <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> >> > wrote: >> >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >> >>> >> >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. >> >>>> >> >>>>> For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR >> >>>>> "paradox", >> >>>>> and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging >> >>>>> to >> >>>>> macrosuperposition. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without >> >>>> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were >> >>>> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in >> >>>> Bell's >> >>>> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and >> >>>> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in >> >>>> any other interpretation. >> >>>> >> >>>> Bruce >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is >> >>> no >> >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where >> >>> somehow >> >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. >> >>> The >> >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >> >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even >> >>> when >> >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything >> >>> that's >> >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in >> >>> the >> >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's >> >>> consciousness >> >>> is >> >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in >> >>> his >> >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when >> >> this >> >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: >> >> >> >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of >> >> QM. >> >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question >> >> of >> >> non-locality in QM. >> >> >> >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an >> >> undisguised >> >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the >> >> decohered >> >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in >> >> favour >> >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain >> > >> > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, >> > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. >> > >> >> Hi David, >> >> > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I >> > recently >> > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be >> > demonstrated >> > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no >> > lack >> > of experimental evidence. >> >> I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I >> disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what >> one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me >> anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I >> can't remember". >> >> Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known >> phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain >> activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember >> dreaming. >> >> These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple >> meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden >> assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the >> light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > > > Sure, but I don't see that anything you've said above is inconsistent with > any particular state of consciousness supervening, in the simple sense of > covariance stated above, with neurological function to any arbitrary level > of detail. Ok, in the simple sense of covariance I agree. Ant viable theory of mind must explain why certain states of consciousness are correlated with certain patterns of neural activity. > Nor for that matter would it be necessary to deny this whatever > one's preferred theory of consciousness might ultimately be (e.g. > computationalism). Agreed. >> >> > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous >> > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question >> > of >> > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as >> > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less >> > obvious >> > and more controversial. >> >> I would say that it depends more on what one is willing to count as >> evidence. > > > Well, what would count as evidence is intimately linked to what would count > as explanation, since what is selected in the first instance as data is > closely dependent on the dictates of theory. My claim is that consciousness is a unique phenomenon, in that it is ultimately a private experience. Indubitably. Theories on consciousness cannot be validated in the same way as all scientific experiences are validated: by direct observation of shared experiences. From physics to psychology and sociology, one can make testable predictions and then replicate experiences that lead to observables that can be collectively verified. This is not so with consciousness. Agreed. Sure, we can take the same drug and talk about our experiences, and conclude that they were similar. And they probably were. But ultimately, there is a language grounding problem. We have no way of comparing qualia, private experience. I cannot even verify experimentally that you are indeed conscious. I assume it heuristically, that's all. OK. Let me tell you how I think about it, heuristically at least, as you say. From my first-personal perspective, 'you' - that is your body - can only ever be said to be "conscious' in the brutely covariate sense. For that matter, the same goes for my observation of my own body. As you say, there's no conceivable objective test that could establish more than this. Nor - and this is telling - would anything more than neurocognition, at least in principle, be required to account for your, or my own, observable behaviour. I think we need to accept that this is indeed telling us something. But what? In my view it's telling us to stop thinking of consciousness as being 'explained' exclusively with reference to its observable physical correlates. IOW this is possibly a paradigm case of the distinction between correlation and causation. The alternative - shorn of its uniquely a posteriori relation with one's own consciousness - would be in effect simply to accept that physical behaviour is its own 'explanation'. This is the conclusion Brent urges on us and I can respect this position without being content with it myself. To go beyond this, as for example Bruno is attempting to do with the comp theory, requires an explanatory schema that somehow manages both to transcend and encapsulate the explication of conscious phenomena in exclusively reductive terms. And to strip this move of any sense of arbitrariness or avoidance of the problem we also need to show that this is a necessary consequence of situating those phenomena adequately within a tractable theory of knowledge. Such a theory will then focus on explicating a characteristic logic of consciousness in terms of what is perceptible or not, what is doubtable or not, what is communicable or not, and so forth. And of course a crucial component of this must be the relation of these categories to the dynamics of the necessarily correlated 'physics of the observable'. I have no problem with theories of mind, but I am not sure that we can expect them to be validated or refuted in the some way that other theories can be. That's right. Not in the same way, but perhaps nonetheless, in principle and with justification, to the extent that it can be said to be explained at all. >> Indirect measures of consciousness entail hidden >> assumptions, and it becomes easy to beg the question. > > > Which particular question did you have in mind? For example: does consciousness in humans supervene only on brain activity? Well, in the terms I've set out: Yes if you you mean the indispensable necessity of covariance with the observable physics, which is to say the spectrum of perceptible externality and its theoretical ontology. No if you mean an explanatory theory of knowledge. In the latter sense it may be said to supervene on something explanatorily prior to the emergence of both 'observation' and the 'observable', as for example in the comp theory. The usual method of detecting consciousness involve monitoring brain activity, so they beg the question. Does what I've said so far affect your possible view of the situation in any way? David Telmo. > David >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> > David >> > >> > In my opinion this results from equating intelligence and human >> > experience with consciousness. Maybe that position is correct, but >> > nobody can claim to know if this is the case. >> > >> > There is overwhelming evidence that the physical brain is a computer, >> > capable of storing memories, detecting patterns, predicting the future >> > and so on. It is also the case that human experience depends on these >> > mechanisms. What there is no evidence for is what is conscious or not. >> > >> > For example, panpsychists hold that everything is conscious. I don't >> > see how such a hypothesis can be falsified at the moment. >> > >> > Telmo. >> > >> >> -- they move in >> >> lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular >> >> measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness >> >> are >> >> conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of >> >> indiscernibles, >> >> there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and >> >> MWI >> >> tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. >> >> >> >> Bruce >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such >> >>> assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do. >> >>> >> >>> Saibal >> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> >> an >> >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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