On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. > > > Yes. > > Of course, it can > > "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject, > > that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine > > random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you need to > > emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication. > > > Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer: > https://www.random.org/ > > :) > > > Using atmospheric noise as an oracle. > > OK, it is better than than using PI or sqrt(2), but is really a computer > with an oracle (which by the way has the same theology than a computer > without oracle, but this is just a note in passing).
On the other hand (and I think Russell said it before here), I am convinced that randomness plays a role in creativity, and there is some evidence from the evolutionary computation community that true randomness is better than pseudo-random generators for this purpose. > Now, prove me that random.org really use the oracle. May be it uses Pi or > 1/Pi. Not sure we could see the difference, if they change the seed > regularly. There is an independent master thesis on this, but I'm not willing to read more than 100 pages on the subject and take their word for it :) It cannot be proved, of course, but there are statistical methods to measure the "quality" of random numbers. Overall, I believe random.org passes several independent tests as is well-regarded. > Well, thanks for letting me know that you are not serious :) I was not :) But if you want real randomness and do not trust a third party, there are other options: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator > but with comp it would have consequences regarding > > our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct? > > > > I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the physics, but > > allow us to exploit more directly the FPI. > > > Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches. > > > And we would become able to compute Fourier transform on the result of some > computations made in all branches. According to Deustch we would be able to > detect the "parallel universes". We would be able to find quickly a needle > in a stack, and I would have less problem to find my glasses on my dekstop > :) :) > I am completely agnostic on this, > > but I am not convince by the current argument that there are evidences that > > a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I wait for > > more evidences. > > > Me too. > > Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even > > suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum > > chaotic dovetailing, > > > > Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing? > > > > Have you heard about quantum chaos? > > > No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved > standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly > changed my map of reality. > > > A not to bad intro is > "http://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/27151/excerpt/9780521027151_excerpt.pdf"; Thanks! > > > Here I meant classical usual dovetailing > > on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can converge > > on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to the Riemann > > hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might correspond > > to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a long time > > ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum-Turing > > universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that would not > > solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can work only > > if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that > > particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical, mechanist) FPI > > problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant. > > > I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this. > > > I might say some words on this when I have more time, but I will resist for > now. > > > > > > but even if that is true, that should not be used to > > justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia > > (unless > > the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!). > > > Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of > > the > > waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically > > non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep > > physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of mechanism. > > But > > his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated by > > machines like PA, ZF, etc. > > > > You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of > > accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil? > > > > I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie to the > > Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel > > realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its own > > Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to sort out his > > own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It limits the > > formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly, leading to > > transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its undecidable > > statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss them as > > mysteries (consciousness). > > > And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark? > > > The confusion between two hypostases. Either willingly, to make easy profit, > like with the clergy, which can confuse man and god for example, or > unwillingly, by repeating lies, or by pure ignorance. You can see the > machine's enlightenment as the realization that G1* proves the equivalence > of all hypostases: > > G1* proves p <-> Bp <-> (Bp & p) <-> (Bp & Dt) <-> (Bp & Dt & p) > (p is restricted to the sigma propositions, the leaves of the UD). > > But all those equivalence are solution of the formula B x -> ~x. It is true > only in God's eye, and false on the terrestrial plane. G1 does not prove any > of those equivalence, with some exception, like p -> Bp (keep in mind that > true sigma proposition are always provable by a universal system). > > > > > Of course, they cannot prove them, nor even > > assert them as new axiom, but they can understand them, and use them, > > notably by becoming "mystical" and "religious", > > > And artists too, I would say... > > > And poets. Certainly (as long as they do not believe doing science in the > process). > > > > and distinguishing *their* > > science from *their* religion, in the scientific way, like they can develop > > the non-monotonical layers of mind on which Gödel's incompleteness will not > > apply: they need only to be able to say something like "Oops, I was wrong", > > which is the beginning of the manifestation of intelligence/doubt (already > > present in the Löb formula). > > > What can one base such bets on? It seems to me that most "betting" is > more or less a Bayesian process, based on priors that are fine-tuned > throughout life in an endless process. > > > I feel myself more frequentist than Bayesian. Bayes works when we have good > reason to have the indifference principle true, but that tend to exist only > in mathematics. Humm... but the principle of indifference can be used to bootstrap an iterative process, where the prior is better approximated as new data becomes available. I would not be surprised if our brain does that a lot. > For example, I suspect that the > main difference between adherents of different ideologies is that they > have different priors for questions such as ("how likely is one to > become rich while being ethical"; "how likely is the government to be > corrupt"; etc.). How does one estimate probabilities beyond the veil? > > > I would say that there are no probabilities at all in such context, only > credibilities and plausibilities. > I will judge a government corrupt when he lies on something for a long time, > or make dubious propositions. It will be a personal judgment, unless I can > rove that it lies on something specific. Ok, but you think it's a lie for some reason. Couldn't that come from other probabilities that you estimate? > Or do you think that this sort of betting transcends probabilistic > thinking? > > > I think that an ideology, like a theory, is based on judgements. It is based > on personal intuition, related to one personal life, experience and > character, and our personal influence (parents school, ...). Agreed. > Probabilies can > be used to study population, make poll, etc. But will not work to get an > information on particular individuals. For ideas, in the human science, we > can hardly build the Omega space (the universe of elementary statistical > results), unless we use very special protocols, like with the > WM-duplication, or applying quantum mechanics on oneself. > > There are as much notion of probability and credibility than there are modal > logic for which []p entails <>p. <>p is a default meta-hypothesis. Somehow > it assumes that when you throw a dice, 1) there is some reality in which the > dice will fall; 2) you will exclude all anomalies (like the dice falling and > rolling under the heavy wardrobe). Ok. > That is why to get probability, we need to conjunct the <>t to the box []p. > To have at least one universe/computation/situation accessible to verify the > prediction. Ok. Telmo. > Bruno > > > > > > Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > T. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > Telmo. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > > an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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