> On 25 Apr 2018, at 20:35, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 4/25/2018 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 22 Apr 2018, at 23:14, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 4/22/2018 7:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> The problem is that when people oppose science and religion, they tend to >>>> forget that “Primary matter” is also a “religion”, and eventually they >>>> take a religion for granted without knowing. >>> You keep saying that, but it's just smearing your philosophical opponents. >>> Just because Patricia Churchland or Daniel Dennett and Anil Seth think >>> material processes can explain consciousness doesn't mean they think matter >>> is primary, or even have the concept of primary matter. >> What would be their alternate primitive notions? > > I don't know. Why should they agree on one. Maybe they have different ideas > or consider it an unanswered question. If I explain that my car gets energy > from burning gasoline are you going to complain that I haven't said what my > primitive notion is?
Only if you claim that you car is a theory of mind or of everything. In this case, the point is that Dennett and the Churchland are inconsistent. > >> >> >> >> >>> They are generally referring to matter like brains and computers which are >>> many levels of composition above quarks, electrons, or strings. >> But they believe that those electron exist primitively, or are composed of >> things existing primitively. > > Maybe. You believe numbers exist primitively. So what? It hasn't helped > you explain quarks and electrons. It explains already two things missed by physicalism: - it explains why such kind of things seems to exist. -it provides a precise road to see if those things are persistent. Physics do not try to do that, very wisely, because it is not physics, but metaphysics/theology, which is another field. But physicalist does, and I just point out that it cannot work, unless they postulate a non computational theory of mind. >> >> >>> And every one of them would instantly reject the idea of worshiping matter >>> or deriving moral precepts from the Standard Model. >> Yes. But we discuss in the metaphysical or theological science. Denote even >> say that physics has no conceptual problem, and his own theory assumed >> brain. Not that brain could be a number illusion or comes from anything non >> material. >> >> >> >>> So "the problem" is in your imagination. You complain of fundamentalism; >>> but you adopt a fundamentalism of computation. >> Not at all. I do not even claim that mechanism is true. Only : >> >> 1) that mechanism entails Theology of Plato and refute the theology of >> Aristotle (the belief in primary matter, or the confusion between primary >> matter and matter). > > But it doesn't actually to that. At best it makes primary matter otiose, and > it does so at the cost of making many things exist for which there is no > evidence. Which one? > >> >> 2) as mechanism entails a quantum many-histories type of reality, >> experimental evidences favours mechanism (immaterialism) on materialism (for >> which there has never been any evidence at all). > > There is a great deal of evidence for materialism. ? You confuse (I guess) the evidence for matter, and the evidence for primary matter (needed for materialism). > It has succeeded as the basis for theories that not only explain but also > predict almost everything that is explained at all. It does not. Physics measures numbers, and extrapolate numbers relation, and fails to explain the relation with our subjective measuring of those numbers. Then with mechanism, I have explained why it *cannot* work at all. > In contrast Platonism has never successfully predicted anything. As Sean > Carroll put it, "All human progress has been made by studying the shadows on > the wall.” Then we are condemned to live in the shadows, and abandon the goal of understanding anything. But I disagree, even the main discoveries in physics are based on the idea that there is something beyond the shadows, if only mathematical relations. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
