On 8/13/2018 6:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 4:32 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 8/13/2018 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> I bring this question up because you repeatedly refer to only "one
> Alice" before the measurement, and also say that Alice and Bob
are "in
> one and the same branch" prior to measurement. But normal QM
without
> collapse would say Alice and Bob are branching all the time, even
> before they measure their entangled pair. So isn't it necessary to
> take this into consideration (that this is implicitly the original
> scenario):
There are many branchings of the wf describing Alice, almost all
of them
are irrelevant to who Alice is. They are below the quasi-classical
level at which "Alice" exists; below the level at which her brain
decides at what angle to measure the particle. All those Alices
are one
person. So they are treated as one classical being. That they split
into two (up or down) classically distinct beings, is unrelated to
the
fact there are many microscopically different Alices.
I agree.
I believe this is exactly why Bruno raised the issue of whether Bruce
was operating under the "Mind-brain identity" theory of mind, vs. the
"computational/mechanist" theory of mind.
The former would attribute 1 mind per each physical incarnation, while
the latter would say there is a 1-to-many relationship between a mind
and its physical instantiations.
Bruce thinks it is irrelevant, but I think your point above shows one
needs to make explicit the theory of mind one is operating within.
It is not clear to me how Bruno thinks of these many quasi-classical,
Alices. He seems to just dismiss their differences as below
replacement
level the Doctor promises. That seems like assuming that they are
really classical entities, just similar computational threads in
the UD.
Computation is a classical notion. I believe Bruno would say there is
a 1-to-many relationship between a mind and its implementations, so
long as those implementations differ functionally only below the level
of detail necessary to describe the computation associated with that
mind (i.e. they differ only below that "substitution level").
This actually seems incoherent though. The very idea of a substitution
level is part of our theory of physics and how computations are
implemented. If computations are in Platonia and physics is just an
inference from computational consciousness there isn't really any lower
level. Physics and the world and personal identity are all illusions
instantiated in all possible computations.
As I understand Bruno's UD theory, there are many threads being
implemented that correspond, over some number of computational states,
to the same thoughts and hence represent only one person during that
interval.
Brent
Jason
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