> On 18 Sep 2018, at 22:00, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:04:25 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net > <javascript:>> wrote: > > >Is that even relevant. Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects. But > >they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible > >to exactly duplicate a brain. > > Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object, but mind is > not a physical object and if mind works on digital principles, and I think it > must, then mind could theoretically be duplicated exactly. If the duplication > was not perfect, if it was way way off then it COULD feel the split, the copy > would say to itself, "something just changed, I feel very differently than I > did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the change because > imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than the original not > better. > > > So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will > > eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational > > difference. > > That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a event without > a cause) if your talking about intelligence, consciousness or self > determination. It's as if on rare and random times for no reason whatsoever a > Turing Machine prints a 0 when the rules say it should have printed a 1. > > > But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the > > split" will be "felt". > > I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near perfectly. > > John K Clark > > > > > > > https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html : > > > "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the > body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?”
That is like Searle who identify mind and brain, which is a category mistake. No first person notion can be identify with anything entirely 3p (third person) describable. I have also a problem with your definition of matter you gave in a previous post. It described what can be emulated directly in language like ADA (with coding, decoding, transport of information). But ADA can be simulated eaxctlin by arithmetic, making matter appearing in arithmetic, which is a bit of nonsense. The appearance of matter can appear, from the 1p view of the entities run by the arithmetical relation. You might study my papers. They show (constructively) why we cannot have both computationalisme (aka digital mechanism) and any form off primitive matter or physicalism. Digital mechanism shows why and how to derive physics from arithmetic. > > > [At] some point in prehistory, our ancestors got into the habit of pursuing > projects of social cooperation by making marks and noises at each other so as > to organize themselves, he said. "That turned out to be a fruitful survival > mechanism." Eventually our ancestors developed social norms—such as if you > grunted "p" you had to grunt "q," or else explain why you didn't grunt > "q"—which we call following the laws of logic and making valid inferences, he > added. > > There was doubtless a genetic mutation somewhere in the background that > allowed this neat adaptive trick, he said. But "once that you've seen that a > certain neurological twist was necessary to get the process of using marks > and noises instead of force as methods of enforcing social cooperation, you > have given the only answer that there is to be given to the question, 'What > is the relation between the mind and the rest of nature?'" > > > > The "mind" simply is the ability to engage in linguistic behavior, he said. > "If you can talk about things, you can also think about things. But you don't > talk about things because you have first thought about things. You didn't > have any thoughts before you had language to think the thoughts with." > > That is a confusion between “a mind” and “some 3p describable symptom of the presence of some mind”. I think that consciousness precedes mind, which precedes thought, which precedes language, unless you put the body in the language (we are biochemical words implemented in a 4D “programming language” in that case. But then physics becomes the linguistic of numbers. To get qualia, it is better to not do that move, and use a theology of machine which is actually independent of language and formal system. See my papers for more on this. Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
