> On 5 Nov 2018, at 19:26, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 11:14:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 5 Nov 2018, at 11:41, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >> >> >> But I claim an experience-processing computer (like our brain) is not >> super-Turing, but is non-Turing: All information it can process is >> Turing-computable, but it also processes experience. > > > I think we agree on this. Experience is NOT information processing. That is > provable using very standard definition (the greek one) and using mechanism. > > But you go out of mechanism by your use of matter in the process of those > experiences. Which seems to me very weird, as it is like invoking a > supernatural being (some primitive matter) which is actually part of the > difficulty when solving the mind-body problem, with or even without mechanism. > > It would be nice if you study the first steps of the Universal Dovetailer > Argument so that we might perhaps be able to isolate where we might really > differ or not, beyond your apparent belief in “matter”. > > Cf > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> > > Bruno > > > > > The way I see it is from what I've called the (pragmatic) PLTOS framework. > At the end of the workday, one needs something that is running inside of or > as a computer. (in the world we are living in.) > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ > > Here the idea is the robot scientist has a conscious agent program (CAP) > codebase, but needs to compile it into a working object. The CAP codebase is > the "theory" (which could include UD code as you have defined it). > > So the scientist could compile CAP to run inside existing of hardware, or use > a synthetic compiler (matter compiler, molecular assembler, ...) to make > "new" hardware (which could be "squishy") with the programming embedded. > > What is the nature of the hardware that allows this task to be achieved? is a > question the robot scientist faces. That gets into what kinds of > compilers/transformers are needed (the T in PLTOS).
That might help with pragmatic issue, but make the metaphysics rather obscure, at least to me. The notion of primitive matter just does not make any sense with computationalism. You cannot invoque an ontological commitment when searching an explanation in metaphysics. That is not valid. Bruno > > - pt > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
