> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com > <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Dennett's said: > > “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the > painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.” > > The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the > trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a > misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs no > interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be different > if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't think he > could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no information. > > And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an > illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although true, > is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the word > "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves > consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" > should never be used at all because it explains nothing.
That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but the primary matter that we infer from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just a wrong inference, as most illusion are. Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.