> On 8 Mar 2019, at 12:29, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 4:42:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional >>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. >>> >>> >>> >>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and >>> applied mathematics >> >> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the >> metaphysics. >> >> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and >> that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have >> application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation >> theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis has >> found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann >> discovered. >> >> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying many >> application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps >> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time. >> >> >> >>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and >>> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at some universities. >> >> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I >> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application >> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I have >> shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was told >> that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, where >> it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but mathematics. >> This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of math are pure >> or not. >> >> And this is even more true with mechanism. There is no more an ontological >> physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never been tested, >> actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was negative for >> “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. And we are pure >> mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That is not entirely >> correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical reason, escapes >> even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality is theological, >> to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a theory, which today, is >> classified in pure mathematics (the logic of provability). >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is. >> >> >> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a big >> difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” universal >> number, and being implemented by something emerging from an infinity of >> computations from the first person points of view. The first leads to the >> theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound machine”), and the >> others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right one, if mechanism >> is correct. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what >>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, >>> etc.). >> >> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is >> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking an >> ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made it”. >> That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is assumed. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on >>> material computers, natural or manmade. >> >> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics. >> >> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we >> understand that a computation is an arithmetical notion, that the physical >> reality too is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body >> problem, you have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing >> completeness) from arithmetic. It is nota question of choice. >> >> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, that >> you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. That >> is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make it >> possible for some tyran to exploit people). >> >> Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, and >> how to test it, in which case the computationalist theory will gives many >> hint. Indeed, if some logics the universal machine gives for matter is >> contradicted by nature, we do have a precise hint how to transform the >> machine theory to get a correct non mechanist theory. >> Today, such theory does not exist, Nature follows perfectly well >> Mechanism,and the theory of apparent matter given by all classical universal >> machine, thanks to QM. >> >> There is no evidence for your metaphysical ontological commitment. Given >> that it makes the mind-body problem unsolvable since a long time, and that >> mechanism explains consciousness and matter already, up to the infinite >> confirmation we must test, like any theory about any reality. We never know >> any publicly communicable truth. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> I was a Brown University student 1971-1979 (all 3 degrees: bachelors, >> masters, Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics). >> >> There is: >> >> Division of Applied Mathematics >> Department of Mathematics >> Department of Philosophy >> >> Why the word "Division" instead of "Department" came in front I'm not sure >> (it divided from the Mathematics department?), but it began at the end of >> WWII to be a link to US federal government interest in applying mathematics >> to science. The Division divided :) in 1979, spinning off Department of >> Computer Science. >> >> The subject of Mathematic Logic (all the incompleteness theorems, etc.) is >> taught in Department of Philosophy. > > Good point for your department of philosophy. Here, it was done in the > department of pure mathematics, and it was badly seen to apply logic, even in > computer science. > > > > >> Still is in 2019 I think. That Department is where the mathematical >> logicians are. >> >> The general mindset (at the time): Mathematics is the fun stuff, Applied >> Mathematics is the real stuff. But there is crossover. > > Such distinction pure/applied can make sense for the curriculum, but does not > make any absolute sense, and should not be taken too much seriously. Pure > today, applicable tomorrow. There is no crisp frontier. > > Philosophy when I was young was marxiste philosophy, and the motto was an > apology of USSR, and a bashing against the US, … In that time, not only you > could not tabor doubt against materialism in metaphysics, but you could not > even critize “dialectical materialism”. The faculty of science was a mix of > serious good willing people, and very ignorant and violent persons. > > Unlike the flemish part of the university, or unlike the nearby catholic > university, philosophers never et with the scientists. Logic, Gödel’s > theorem, was considered as pure mathematics only. It was forbidden even for > the late department of computer science, hold by physicist, without any > mathematicians. > > Bruno > > > > I am an experiential materialist - matter itself has both informationality > and experientiality -
I have no clue what you mean by matter. Plotinus’s notion of One, makes it simple, and Plotinus envisages that The One might have no informationality at all, as it reasons rather convingly that it would made the one complex and multiples. To me, your theories looks like identifying two mysteries: matter and consciousness. I don’t see this as capable to provide light on matter, nor on consciousness. > (like Strawson), and define Codicalism as the dialectics of language and > matter. > - https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/03/02/language-matter-dialectics/ > > Language includes mathematics and scientific theories How will you distinguish a theory in mathematics and a mathematical reality (model) which satisfies the theorem of the theory? How do you distinguish a Lie group, which sometime can be quite infinite and complex, with the theory of Lie groups, which is a finite object. > - like the Standard Model, Einstein Field Equations, etc. They are all > "fictionalist". In the later case they may be "useful" fictions. It is unclear if it the language, the theories, or the model of the theories which are fiction here. > > I never quite got into the mood to delve deeply into dialectical materialism > (Marxism). A good point for you (!) > In economic terms, the dialectics of the welfare state (a blending of > capitalism and socialism) is enough. If the blending is made in the democratic way, that is OK. As long as nobody asks the richer to give their money to the poorer, the poorer will have some hope getting richer. Now, if the richer have made their money by stealing the money to the poor, for example by lies and propaganda, then they have to give the money back, and be judged. But when the people put bandits at the top, that begins rather hard to do. It can take time. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
