> On 13 Mar 2019, at 22:08, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 8:07 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > My computer told me that this post has not be sent. Apology if it was > > already sent. It is an old posts, but I think it is somehow important. > > I'm only going to comment on about 10% of your very long post because the > other 90% is just stuff I've heard 6.02*10^23 times before about the > scientifically illiterate ancient Greeks, peepee, the Universal Dance > Association, and how I am the most religious man who ever lived. > > >>And the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 AD was about the same as > >>the the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 BC, so apparently doing > >>metaphysics with any sort of attitude is a waste of time. > > > I think the contrary. Without the progress in theology during that period > > [...] > > Progress in theology?? What's the difference between good theology and bad > theology? None that I can see.
You confess not to read the pre-dogmatic theology. Are you aware that after Justinian, in 529, the academy of Plato has been has been closed, by order, and the platonist philosopher or thinker where persecuted and most of them will fly from Athene to Alexandria, where Hypatia will eventually taught Plotinus theology and Diphantius Algebra, and indeed, this will lead to the judo-Islamic era, full of rich merchandising and a development of science … up to 1248, where again, the muslim will commit the same error than the christians in 529, in the famous contrevery between Averroes and Al Ghazli: Averroès: the Text must be submitted to reason. Al Ghazali: Reason must be submitted to Text. Which will lead to the decline of the Muslims of the Middle-East. The Platonician are the skeptical one; notably on Aristotle “primary materialism”, even more so of what some “mainstream” school of those religion can take, when institutionalised (the authentic “blasphemy” as well understood by the greeks and the taoist Chinese (but that has not prevented the Taoist to also fall in the “theological trap”, like harbouring any certainty in that subject. Theology has progressed, but if you don’t study the non confessional theology of the greeks, you will not been able to appreciate it, of course. Yet, The theology of the universal machine, the Löbian one, provides a simple transparent interpretation of Plotinus’ theology in arithmetic. Even in the way Simplicius attributes to a thinker of the first century, Moderatus, which is related Parmenides, and take the form of five important mode of reality: The one, The intellect/intelligible/believer/third-person self The knower/soul/first-person The intelligible matter The sensible matter The one, here “played”, or represented by the notion of truth, for example the set of sigma_1 true arithmetical sentences (that represents already the universal dovetailing), but for the start, and simplicity, we can use the “full” first order truth: the set of all true arithmetical sentences. The intellect/intelligible is played by the Gödel “beweisbar” provability predicate: []p The soul/knower/first person is placed by the formal conjunct of provability and truth: []p & p The Intelligible matter, the one where God can no more control things (the platonician reconstruction of the Aristotle definition). It is the first person indeterminacy on the consistent extension, and it is motivated by the thought experiences, or by the Theatetus of Plato. It is played by []p & <>t. It assumes a reality de facto. (By the completeness theorem. The beauty is that G* proves that all those modes describes the exact same extensional arithmetical reality, yet, G*, saw how much those mode-equivalence are not accessible to the machine, and obeys quite different logic and mathematics. Indeed we get classical mathematics (God, the One), intuitionist mathematics (the soul), quantum mathematics (intelligible matter), intuitionistic quantum logic (sensible matter). You know you dislike both reading old text, and doing thought experience, or listening to the machine (through a bit of mathematical logic), but you seem also attached to your philosophical conviction that physicalism is true, or that there is a PRIMARY physical universe, and that only physics can explain consciousness. But it fails up to now, and here, we see that with Church thesis, it does not fail, as quantum logics and alternate consistent histories appears in arithmetic at the place the thought experience suggests and the math obliges. You told us that consciousness is easy, and you told us that you did understand that consciousness is not localised, but you still assume a god, even if only a non personal one, an ontological commitment, if you prefer, which is not valid when we do science. You keep fighting for Aristotle without saying. You are an ally to those who fight against those who want to come back to reason in the fundamental questioning mind and person included. And, pardon me, but you have the first argument ever, the one used by Bruno, in “Sylvie and Bruno”, when he talk about spinach. Sylvie: Please, Bruno, eat Spinach, it is new, it is good. Bruno: No! I hate Spinach! Sylvie: but you have never eaten them, How could you know that you hate them? Bruno: that is the point, if I eat them, I might like them, but that is the very idea which disgusts me the most! Replace “(neo)platonist philosophy/theology” for Spinach, and that is your argument. > > > none of the modern mathematics, physics, computer science, would exist. You > > seem to believe that science is born at your birth. It is born in -500, and > > has evolved a lot up to 529. > > There was almost no progress in science or mathematics between 100 and 529 > AD, especially in Christian Europe, the big jump had to wait for another 900 > years or so. > > > You can't experiment with invisible factors and an experiment that produces > > invisible results verifies nothing. > > > Visibility is Aristotle’s religion. > > Meaning needs contrast and Brunospeak is not my native language so please > name something that is NOT a religion. I've asked you to do this before but > you never did. > > >> there is no point in worrying about consciousness until you've first > >> solved the problem of intelligence, > > > You said yourself that consciousness is easy, > > It's far TOO easy, it's so easy ANY consciousness theory will work because > there are no facts they must satisfy, and that's why every Tom Dick and Harry > on the internet is peddling their own consciousness theory. But there are > vastly fewer intelligence theoreticians on the net because that's hard and > unlike consciousness theories they can be tested. > > > Literalism is bad in religion > > Everything is bad in religion because religion is just bad. As Christopher > Hitchens said "religion ruins everything”. This is sheer nonsense. Especially if you read well Christopher Hitchens, which seemed to me to make clear that he is talking of the authoritarian religion, which has been the reason to steal theology to science. What you say is like saying that Genetics is bad, because it has given rise to the biggest human made catastrophes (a Russian famine, after Lyssenko tried its “materialist genetics”, and considered the notion of gene as too much “small bourgeois” to be be valid with Marx and Lenine. You should not even compare a branch of science, with what any authoritarian (dogmatic) group of humans do with it when stolen from the domain of reason (science). You can’t impose your materialist conviction, science does not work that way. > > >> If time and space are not made use of in your mystical invisible timeless > >> Turing Machine how do you go from step N to step N+1, what is the > >> relationship between the 2 steps? > > > The transition table of the Turing machine, > > A transition table never changes, thus it can't DO anything > > > or The reduction in the combinators, > > Mathematics never changes, thus it can't DO anything > > > or A clock in the von Neumann mathematical computer > > A software clock can't change without the help of physical hardware, and a > clock that can't change is not a clock. > > >> explain how a non-material Turing machine that has nothing to do with > time or space can be so important when time and space are so critical to our > intelligence and consciousness. > > > Yes, but no primary matter needs to be invoke for this. You point makes > > sense, but is not valid to refute the immaterialist consequence of > > mechanism. > > Could you please make clear your distinction between matter and primary > matter and why this distinction is important. Primary matter, or primary physics is the idea that the fundamental reality is the physical reality. It is the assumption that what we see is the real thing, and that is the Aristotelian Assumption. For an Aristotelian matter = primary matter, they take the existence of the measurable numbers for granted. Platonist, in the large sense, are those who doubt this, for whatever reason, they conceive that there might be a simpler conceptual solution, like “first principles”, “equation”, or beauty, art, music. > Even if you're right and pure mathematics can produce matter (and I can't see > any way it could) I reassure you, nor do I. But the sigma_1 arithmetical relation does emulate computations, when taken in the sense of Gödel-Herbrand-Kleene-Church-Post-Turing. Post discovered anticipated all this in the 1920s. Including the immateriality, but still retracting itself from it in a footnote. > it would still be necessary for mathematics to first produce matter before > intelligence or consciousness could emerge. Not if you can survive with a digital computer, qua computation, that is in virtue of that computer doing the right things, including the local counterfactuals accessible, because no universal machine at, can ever make the distinction between A computation supported by a Fortran interpreter, run by an Algol interpreter, run by a combinator, run by a diophantine polynomial run by a physical super-macintosh computer From A computation supported by a Fortran interpreter, run by an Algol interpreter, run by a combinator, run by a diophantine polynomial run by a Relevant-subset-of-physical super-macintosh computer run by a diophantine polynomial (again). The mechanist assumption is the assumption that a relevant Turing complete laws of physics is enough, at the “right” level of substitution, which is assumed to exist. But then, it becomes absolutely undecidable if our reality is bigger than the sigma_1 arithmetical reality, which runs all computations. But despite this, it remains testable, as physics has be be given to some mode of self-reference imposed by incompleteness, and indeed everything match up. > > >> I can know your proof is incorrect by just asking a few very simple > >> questions about the thought experiment it is based on; such as " after the > >> experiment has been concluded what did the correct answer turn out to be, > >> Moscow or Washington?” > > > As the answer must be confirmed by both copies, > > Confirmed? What with your massive confusion with personal pronouns The amount of exaggeration betray your doubt on this. Good. The pronouns are my specialty. The theory above, extracted from the mathematical logic of self-reference, introduces and make precise 8 notion of selves. 8 because truth and provability not only imposes those “vertical nuances”, but it split three mathematical modes in two, which distinguish the truth that the machine can know, like “I am the one reconstituted in Moscow” and the one they can communicate “My body will be in the two city”. Your refutation of step 1, when translated into the machine’s theory of self-reference was a confusion between []p and []p & p, and some variants. > causes be the existence of a personal pronoun duplicating machine you can't > even clearly state what the question is much less confirm that that the > answer was correct. Because you deny the first person discourse. I can perfectly predict what will happen to me, in the first person sense of the self. If coffee is offered in the two places Washington and Moscow, I can predict that I will have coffee with certainty (modulo the usual default hypothesis, which is the “<>t” of “[]p & <>t”, BTW), but I cannot know if I will drink it in W or in W, yet I know it will be one of them”. And when we do the experience, both the M-guy and the W-Guy, confirm. The iteration of that experience, leads most WMMWWWM….WWWWMWMMMW type of guys predicts “white noise” or random, or incompressible sequences. And they are right, with mechanism, as taking them all, you get the prefect Pascal triangle, or Gaussian for very large iteration. > > > the correct prediction was “W v M”, > > You predict that the result of my coin flip experiment will turn out to be > heads or tails. I then flip the coin and it turns out to be tails. So tell > me, what have we learned from this experiment? Absolutely positively > nothing. The coin is another type of indeterminacy. A laplacian god can still predict it. That is not the case in the quantum indeterminacy, even a Laplacian God cannot predict the result to the guy doing the experiment. The same occur with the digital mechanist self-duplication, the Laplacian God is defeated again, yet, without assuming a mysterious quantum world that nobody really understand. We assume only elementary arithmetic, and of course build on the giant discovery of Turing, Gödel, … Solovay (the discovery of G and G*). > > > neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow man existed yesterday back in > > Helsinki > > > Then the H-guy died. > > Yes the H-guy does not exist today, but only if you define the H-guy as the > man who was in Helsinki yesterday because today is not yesterday so today > there is no way a man can be a man in Helsinki yesterday. Of course that > would be a very very stupid was to define the H-guy, a much smarter > definition would be the H-guy today is anybody who remembers being the H-guy > yesterday. Which I used all the time. Indeed, that is why each reconstituted copies can claim having survived, as they should assuming mechanism, but then listen to them both, and each says “I survived in only one city and I realise I could not have predicted which one”. > > >> who exactly was supposed to make the prediction yesterday back in Helsinki > >> and just as important who exactly was the prediction supposed to be about?” > > > Simple enough, and you know the answer. > > Yes I know the answer, you don't know. I sincerely hope it is has been clarified. The answer is, concerning what I expect in the first person mode, that I expect to bring coffee, and that it will be either in Washington, or in Moscow, but I can be sure of which one. > if you did you wouldn't hesitate to tell me me but that can't be done > without personal pronouns with no referent. We agreed on them. As other have shown to you, you did use the same pronouns in Everertt-QM, and your argument that physical doppelgänger can met has been shown not relevant, or you need to explain how a universal machine can distinguish a virtual quantum emulation, from a classical one, and you will have to violate the Church-Turing thesis at some point, or provide the algorithm. > > >> If AFTER the experiment you STILL don't know what the correct answer > >> should have been then it was not a experiment and only a fool would keep > >> reading more about it. > > > That is ridiculous. If I look at a chroedinger cat, and see it alive, that > > does not imply he was alive before I look at it. Your statement here would > > contradict QM-without-collapse, if not any use of probability in science. > > After the box is opened and the Schrodinger Cat experiment is over and > everybody packed up their equipment and went home we know what the correct > prediction of the cat's fate would have been, but after your "experiment" is > over we STILL don't know what the correct answer would have been. That means you do not use Everett, but Copenhagen. OK. I will go without in the box in Helsinki. Before pushing the button, we make our prediction. In Moscow, I tell you OK, mine is validated, etc. We know the results of the experiment. That we have doppelgänger getting different result, well it is like in QM, unless you make a last collapse, they are there two. And the fact we can met them is irrelevant when using mechanism, unless you add some non Turing emulable magic. > We have learned precisely nothing from it and that is the very definition of > a failed experiment, we haven't even learned what won't work. We learn that explains the collapse appearance with the wave has to be extended to the appearance of the wave in arithmetic, where all computations are emulated in virtue of the elementary arithmetical truth. We have reduced the mind-body problem, to derive physics in the mode of sef-rerefences, and it works, including the distinction between quanta and qualia. Oh! We lean we need to backtrack 1500 years in theology, as the greeks got the right big picture, unless tomorrow someone show that physics diverges from mechanism, but that is why we need to pursue the testing. 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