> On 26 Apr 2019, at 18:51, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, 26 April 2019 18:41:06 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> And there can be more said about existence. How I also detail in the book, >> existance is first the act of self-reference of looking-back-at-itself and >> thus creating the first object: "I am". Then because of emergence > > Emergence from what? How? Why? > > How could “I am” be an object? It is a proposition about some possible object > “I”, how do you define “I”? > > > Emergence from looking-back-at-itself. With each looking-back-at-itself > self-reference enriches itself. How and why I don't know.
I can make sense of this in the Mechanist frame. But there we make the “ontology” (what we assume at the start) very clear, and very simple. Staring from consciousness is like starting from the answer, to me. > "I am" is an object because that's what happens when the unformalizable > self-reference looks-back-at-itself: it finds itself, and finding of itself > is necessarily an object. So since on the first looking-back-at-itself there > is nothing else there except itself, it will find itself as an object. So the > "I" is the first object with which self-reference identifies itself, and > automatically that object will have as quality the quality of ontological > subjectivity. “I am” is an object, as it is a sentence, a sequence of symbol. But the Maning of “I am” is not an object, but more like an event, a thought, an happening. And if it is the first person self-reference, it is provably not an object, but a lived experience which cannot be associated to anything in the third person way. The first person I is a subject, a person, not really an object in the usual sense. The body is an object, not a soul. > > >> where you have qualities inheritance, the quality of "existence" of the >> first object is inherited in all the above objects. So when I see red, > > But why would you see red in the first place? > > > I don't know. Probably some evolutionary reasons. That would explain the easy part of the consciousness problem, but not the hard problem (which is the well known, by philosopher of mind or theologian, mind-body problem. > > >> the logical structure of the state of seeing red is: "I am red."/"I exist as >> red". (of course, is more complicated, since it includes all the previous >> levels, so it is actually something like: "I am vividness, diversity, >> memory, time, black-and-white, shades-of-gray, red.”) > > This assumes so many things, that it is a bit unclear to me. > > Red doesn't just appear as an object in self-reference. There are certain > conditions for the quality of red to be possible to be experienced, such as a > pre-existing ability of experiencing visual qualia. So self-reference can > only gradually arrive at the experience of red. So when it finally arrives at > red, it will already have certain objects in itself with which it already > identifies with. So experiencing red is actually a quite complex state of > self-reference. OK. > > As I said, 99,9% of theoretical computer science is based on the notion of > self-reference, and incompleteness imposes all the nuances already found by > Plato, so we get a very standard classical theory of mind, which explains > most aspect of consciousness and the “illusion” of the physical reality, and > why the illusion does last and why it is first person sharable (making the > physical reality looking real from inside) > > What is the "self" in your "self-reference” ? That is not easy to explain shortly. In the theology of the machine, counting large, there are 8 notion of selves. Counting even larger, there are 4 + 4*infinity notion of self, as the material selves are graded, and admits infinities of variants. The two main self are the 3p-self and the 1p-self. The 3p-self is rather well known by computer scientist, and can be seen as a control structure, which is the ability to refer to its own code, integrally. The language SMALLTALK has that control structure build in, and is called “SELF”. It allows a program to refer to its code, like in this code for the factorial function: BEGIN READ n, IF n = 0, OUTPUT 1, ELSE (MULTIPLY N TO (APPLY SELF (MINUS N 1). END That makes possible to have program answering any question on their code, or giving their own code like the amoeba, which is just BEGIN OUTPUT SELF END If you execute that program, it gives BEGIN OUTPUT SELF END .How to implement it? I cana explain in all details, but I give only the basic idea, which consist in applying a duplicator to itself. If Dx produces xx, DD will produce DD. If Dx produces F(xx), then DD produces F(DD). It is “diagonalization”. But here, such programs would not stop, and it is a bit more tricky to make them stop, as you need to define a special “quote” function. We can come back on this. The solution is really given by the so called “second theorem of recursion” found by Kleene. It needs some familiarity with the phi_i, which I have explained more than once in this list, but, well, it needs some absence of math-anxiety … Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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