> On 21 Apr 2019, at 11:48, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Apr 19, 2019, at 11:21, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net >>> <mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 18:45, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 17 Apr 2019, at 08:08, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net >>>>> <mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 05:03, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 4/16/2019 6:10 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019, at 03:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> You seem to make self-reference into something esoteric. Every Mars >>>>>>>> Rover knows where it is, the state of its batteries, its instruments, >>>>>>>> its communications link, what time it is, what its mission plan is. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't agree that the Mars Rover checking "it's own" battery levels is >>>>>>> an example of what is meant by self-reference in this type of >>>>>>> discussion. The entity "Mars Rover" exists in your mind and mine, but >>>>>>> there is no "Mars Rover mind" where it also exists. The entity "Telmo" >>>>>>> exists in your mind and mine, and I happen to be an entity "Telmo" in >>>>>>> whose mind the entity "Telmo" also exists. This is real self-reference. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or, allow me to invent a programming language where something like this >>>>>>> could me made more explicit. Let's say that, in this language, you can >>>>>>> define a program P like this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> program P: >>>>>>> x = 1 >>>>>>> if x == 1: >>>>>>> print('My variable x s holding the value 1') >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The above is the weak form of self-reference that you allude to. It >>>>>>> would be like me measuring my arm and noting the result. Oh, my arm is >>>>>>> x cm long. But let me show what could me meant instead by real >>>>>>> self-reference: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> program P: >>>>>>> if length(P) > 1000: >>>>>>> print('I am a complicated program') >>>>>>> else: >>>>>>> print('I am a simple program') >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Do you accept there is a fundamental difference here? >>>>>> >>>>>> I take your point. But I think the difference is only one of degree. >>>>>> In my example the Rover knows where it is, lat and long and topology. >>>>>> That entails having a model of the world, admittedly simple, in which >>>>>> the Rover is represented by itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would also say that I think far too much importance is attached to >>>>>> self-reference. It's just a part of intelligence to run "simulations" >>>>>> in trying to foresee the consequences of potential actions. The >>>>>> simulation must generally include the actor at some level. It's not >>>>>> some mysterious property raising up a ghost in the machine. >>>>> >>>>> With self-reference comes also self-modification. The self-replicators of >>>>> nature that slowly adapt and complexify, the brain "rewiring itself"... >>>>> Things get both weird and generative. I suspect that it goes to the core >>>>> of what human intelligence is, and what computer intelligence is not >>>>> (yet). But if you say that self-reference has not magic property that >>>>> explains consciousness, I agree with you. >>>> >>>> >>>> You need some magic, but the magic of the truth of “2+3=5” is enough. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On consciousness I have nothing interesting to say (no jokes about ever >>>>> having had, please :). I think that: >>>>> >>>>> consciousness = existence >>>> >>>> >>>> Hmm… That looks like God made it. Or like “it is”. >>>> >>>> Are you OK with the ideas that from the point of view of a conscious >>>> entity, consciousness is something: >>>> >>>> Immediately knowable, and indubitable, (in case the machine can reason) >>>> Non definable, and non provable to any other machine. >>> >>> I agree. Would this not also apply to the concept of "existance”? >> >> I am not sure what you mean by “existence” when used alone. It might be a >> “professional deformation”, but to me existence is a logical quantifier, and >> is not a intrinsic property. > > Ok, I see. I'm not sure if the existential qualifier in predicate logic, for > example, points to the same thing I mean.
Probably not, but that is why you should explain a bit more what you mean by existence. I think you mean the feeling of personal existence, which is indeed a not to bad definition of consciousness, but not really an explanation, because a “feeling” is an as hard a notion than “consciousness”. > >> >> I think that may be consciousness is a fixed point of existence, in the >> sense that “existence of consciousness” is equivalent with “consciousness”. >> >> If you are using “existence” is a more sophisticated sense, then this should >> be elaborated? > > I'm trying to use it in the least sophisticated way possible. I might be defend by logic. But existence, for me, doe not mean anything? Only existence of something means something, and the whole question is what is the minimal amount of things that we have to assume to explain all the rest. The materialist believes that we have to assume matter, but fail to explain how matter select the computations in arithmetic, making his theory at best incomplete (but then it has to be extended in some dualist theories), or “magical”. > >> >> We cannot prove the existence of anything, without assuming the existence of >> something. With mechanism, we have to assume the existence of numbers (or to >> derive from something Turing equivalent, like I did with the combinators), >> so I doubt that existence is immediately knowable, etc. Unless again, you >> meant “existence of consciousness”, but then this cannot apply to define >> consciousness. >> >> You might need to elaborate about what you mean by “existence”, when used >> alone. > > I mean there being something rather than nothing, the universe, or > multiverse, or whatever the whole cow is. We cannot explain the existence from nothing. With mechanism, we can assume the numbers, to explain both consciousness and matter appearances. Indeed the theory of consciousness leads quickly to a many-histories interpretation of “very elementary arithmetic”. (Peano without induction). Then, arithmetic is already rich enough to explain why we cannot derive arithmetic from anything else which would not assumes them implicitly (like the combinators) or explicitly, like Robinson Arithmetic. Evertuing is reduced to one “mystery” (the natural number), but that is enough to explain why that mystery is necessary insoluble, for pure logical reason (that is basically found already by Dedekind, and justified completely by Tarski, Gödel, etc.). > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> Then the mathematical theory of self-reference explains why machine will >>>> conclude that they are conscious, in that sense. They will know that they >>>> know something that they cannot doubt, yet cannot prove to us, or to >>>> anyone. And they can understand that they can test mechanism by >>>> observation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Existence entails self-referential machines, self-referential >>>>> evolutionary processes, the whole shebang. But not the other way around. >>>> >>>> Existence of the natural numbers + the laws of addition and multiplication >>>> does that, and also justify what you don’t get any of that with any weaker >>>> theory, having less axioms, than Robinson Arithmetic. >>>> >>>> We have to assume numbers if we want just define precisely what a machine >>>> is, but we cannot assume a physical universe: that is the price, we have >>>> to derive it from arithmetic “seen from inside”. >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>> My point is much less sophisticated. It is such a trivial observation that >>> I would call it a Lapalissade. And yet, in out current culture, you risk >>> being considered insance for saying it: >>> >>> Our first-person experience of the world is what exists, as far as we know. >> >> Yes, but as far as we know it for sure, we know only our own personal >> experience here-and-now. We have no other certainties. OK. > > > Right, but what I mean is that ontologies with particles at the bottom are > favored these days, but there is no particular reason to prefer them to > ontologies with first-person experiences at the bottom. A material (with particles, say) ontology fails to explain how those particles select a computation among the infinities going through our states. That is why honest materialist, who defend Mechanism, like Dennett and the Churchland, have to eliminate consciousness (first person) from reality. Of course we usually agree in this list that it makes non sense. An ontological first person at the base of everything, is like saying God made it. It uses the main mystery (god, consciousness, first person), but fails to explain anything, neither the illusion of matter, nor the existence of the illusion itself. Mechanism explains entirely the illusion, and the existence of first person flux of consciousness, but at the price of making the illusion of matter to be explained by the number-self-reference, and amaszinly enough, it works (up to now) confirming (up to now) that mechanism and its immaterialism are far more plausible than materialism and its needed dualism or eliminativisme. > > I subscribe to John Wheeler's view that our universe is participatory. Wheeler is ambiguous. Sometimes he talks like the participatory universe go against the “many-world”, sometimes not. With mechanism, arithmetic explains why the physical universe is a first person plural construction, which is akin to the participatory idea, but our “real reality” is not. It is just the mathematical structure (N, +, x, s, 0). The participation is internal and phenomenological, and given by some of the self-referential mode of the universal machine. The physical universe is no more a universe, but a border of the arithmetical reality when seen from inside arithmetic, by arithmetical, and partial computable, creature/entities. It is not a long way from Wheeler “it from bits”, and indeed, once we address the illusion of matter, we get qubits from bits (almost). > What there is is something observing itself. Like all universal number do, although the very elementary arithmetic does not observe itself as much as the Löbian creature that it emulates. It is conscious like all universal numbers, but it is not self-conscious, like the Löbian number that it emulates. > The third-person reality is a useful model, but perhaps it is a second-order > thing. The third-person physical reality seems to not exist, as physics appears only in the first person plural mode. But a third person reality remains: arithmetic (and thus combinators, fortran, Brent, Telmo, Bruno, seen as bodies, representations, etc.) > The fashionable idea of our times is that "we" are the second-order thing, > not the particles. Yes, the fashionable idea is a myth which last since Aristotle and even more since the Roman. That is provably incompatible with Mechanism. The first order thing (in your sense here is the number, consciousness and person are second order, but the particles and waves are third order. To make consciousness primitive is like abandoning explain it, which is a bit sad, given that the numbers explains very well consciousness, when we listen to them. > > https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/0*v2X3sbLjk8rs-uFK > <https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/0*v2X3sbLjk8rs-uFK>. > >> >>> Everything else is a model, including the third-person view. >> >> Yes. (Of course a logician would call that a theory, as a model = a reality, >> like the painters used that word). > > It is very confusing to use these words with mathematicians... :) It is a terrible problem. It generates an artificial gap between physicists and logicians, which obscures the real gap between logicians/physicist and theologian/metaphysicians. > >> >>> There was no Big Bang at the same ontological level that there is a blue >>> pen in my desk, because the Big Bang is nobody's experience (or is it?). >> >> With resect to Mechanism, the pen of he desk is similar to the Big Bang. We >> believe in them from indirect evidence. It does not seem so for the pen, >> because our brain make the relevant computation mostly unconsciously. For >> the Big Bang, we have used much more brains (using indirectly the brain of >> colleagues, Hubble, Einstein, and using telescope, making the computations >> more consciously, but it is just a matter of degree. > > Ok, that's a good point. > >> >>> The Big Bang is something that the machine has to answer if you ask it >>> certain questions. As you say, if the machine is consistent then the big >>> bang is "true" in a sense, if the macine is malevolent all bets are off. >> >> >> Gödel proved that “consistent” is the same as having a model (in the >> logician sense of reality, not a theory). So the notion of truth is always >> relative to a model, the reality we are pointing too. In our local reality, >> there are evidence of personal birth, star, galaxies, and the Big Bang. Now >> if the logic of the material modes where contradicted by nature, that would >> be an evidence that the Big Bang, and some physical stuff, is ontologically >> real, > > Ok with the rest, but I don't get this step… It would help to see what you don’t understand. Many people have an hard time to understand that the existence of all computations is a mathematical consequence of “2+2 & Co.”, despite all logicians knows that since 1931. Digital physicalism do understand this, but it fails to take the first person indeterminacy into account. (Which is normal, as this use the shocking idea that we are mulitiplied by infinity in the arithmetical reality, (by the first person invariance for the computation delays, and the material/virtual/arithmetical invariance). But if you undesrtand both the arithmetical nature of the computations, and the first person indeterminacy, then, it seems to me it is just a matter of work to see that the logic of the observable as to be given by some modes of self-reference, like when we ask ourself where we will be reconstituted in a duplication experience. The fact that we find quantum logic/physics there confirms mechanism, at the place where physicalism is refuted or is eliminating consciousness and (first) persons. Bruno > > Telmo. > >> but thanks to quantum mechanics, we have the contrary evidences, which means >> the Big Bang is more like a percept in some video games (which all exist in >> arithmetic). Below the substitution level, mechanism predict that we can >> “see” (indirectly) the presence of the infinitely many computations which >> support us, and that explain the quantum from the machine’s theory of >> consciousness/knowledge/observation. >> >> The fundamental science is theology, or metaphysics. Physics is a statistics >> deducible from the logic of the first person plural view ([]p & <>t, you can >> read it “p is true in all models é there is one model”): that give the >> probability one for p. ([]p alone cannot work, because of the cul-de-sac >> worlds where []p is vacuously true). >> >> The malevolent machine must be invoked, for being logically correct, even if >> that can be judged non reasonable. I mean, if Z1* departs from nature >> observation, it means that mechanism is false OR we are in a malevolent >> simulation. But up to now, thanks to “many-world QM”, nature confirms >> Mechanism, and thus indirectly the whole theory of consciousness or theology. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Telmo. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Telmo >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Whether it is "formalizable" or not would seem to depend on >>>>>>>> choosing the right formalization to describe what engineers already >>>>>>>> create. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 4/15/2019 11:28 AM, za_wishy via Everything List wrote: >>>>>>>>> Hmm... the thing is that what I'm arguing for in the book is that >>>>>>>>> self-reference is unformalizable, so there can be no mathematics of >>>>>>>>> self-reference. More than this, self-reference is not some concept in >>>>>>>>> a theory, but it is us, each and everyone of us is a form of >>>>>>>>> manifestation of self-reference. Self-reference is an eternal logical >>>>>>>>> structure that eternally looks-back-at-itself. And this >>>>>>>>> looking-back-at-itself automatically generates a subjective ontology, >>>>>>>>> an "I am". In other words, the very definition of the concept of >>>>>>>>> "existence" is the looking-back-at-itself of self-reference. So, >>>>>>>>> existence can only be subjective, so all that can exists is >>>>>>>>> consciousness. I talk in the book how the looking-back-at-itself >>>>>>>>> implies 3 properties: identity (self-reference is itself, x=x), >>>>>>>>> inclusion (self-reference is included in itself, x<x) and >>>>>>>>> transcendence (self-reference is more than itself, x>x). And all >>>>>>>>> these apparently contradictory properties are happening all at the >>>>>>>>> same time. So, x=x, x<x, x>x all at the same time. But there is no >>>>>>>>> actual contradiction here, because self-reference is unformalizable. >>>>>>>>> The reason why I get to such weird conclusions is explored throughout >>>>>>>>> the book where a phenomenological analysis of consciousness is done >>>>>>>>> and it is shown how it is structured on an emergent holarchy of >>>>>>>>> levels, a holarchy meaning that a higher level includes the lower >>>>>>>>> levels, and I conclude that this can only happen if there is an >>>>>>>>> entity called "self-reference" which has the above mentioned >>>>>>>>> properties. So as you can see, there pretty much cannot be a >>>>>>>>> mathematics of self-reference. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I will also present about self-reference at The Science of >>>>>>>>> Consciousness conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if >>>>>>>>> you are there we can talk more about these issues. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> Hi Cosmin, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given >>>>>>>>> by the universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who >>>>>>>>> already knows that they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA, or the >>>>>>>>> combinators + some induction principle). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the >>>>>>>>> mathematical theory of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel >>>>>>>>> and Löb, and Solovay ultimate formalisation of it at the first order >>>>>>>>> logic level. You cite Penrose, which is deadly wrong on this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides >>>>>>>>> almost directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to >>>>>>>>> agree that consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, >>>>>>>>> non provable and non definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted >>>>>>>>> to such proposition all the “time”. But this enforces also, as I have >>>>>>>>> shown, that the whole of physics has to be justified by some of the >>>>>>>>> modes of self-reference, making physics into a subbranch of >>>>>>>>> elementary arithmetic. This works in the sense that at the three >>>>>>>>> places where physics should appear we get a quantum logic, and this >>>>>>>>> with the advantage of a transparent clear-cut between the qualia (not >>>>>>>>> sharable) and the quanta (sharable in the first person plural sense). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You seem to have a good (I mean correct with respect to Mechanism) >>>>>>>>> insight on consciousness, but you seem to have wrong information on >>>>>>>>> the theory of the digital machines/numbers and the role of Gödel. >>>>>>>>> Gödel’s theorem is really a chance for the Mechanist theory, as it >>>>>>>>> explains that the digital machine are non predictable, full of non >>>>>>>>> communicable subjective knowledge and beliefs, and capable of >>>>>>>>> defeating all reductionist theory that we can made of them. Indeed, >>>>>>>>> they are literally universal dissident, and they are born with a >>>>>>>>> conflict between 8 modes of self-apprehension. In my last paper(*) I >>>>>>>>> argue that they can be enlightened, and this shows also that >>>>>>>>> enlightenment and blasphemy are very close, and that religion leads >>>>>>>>> easily to a theological trap making the machine inconsistent, except >>>>>>>>> by staying mute, or referring to Mechanism (which is itself highly >>>>>>>>> unprovable by the consistent machine). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>>> send an email to everyth...@ <>googlegroups.com >>>>>>>>>> <http://googlegroups.com/>. >>>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@ <>googlegroups. >>>>>>>>>> <http://googlegroups.com/>com <http://googlegroups.com/>. >>>>>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>>>> 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