> On 1 May 2019, at 00:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 4/30/2019 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 28 Apr 2019, at 21:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 4/28/2019 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> Indexical Digital Mechanism, or simply Mechanism, is the idea that we can >>>> survive with an artificial brain. It is the idea that my consciousness, or >>>> my first-person experience, is invariant for some functional digital >>>> substitution of my brain/body at some level of substitution (neurons, or >>>> perhaps atoms, or quarks and electron, or strings, etc.). >>> But notice that already quantum mechanics strongly limits this.?? By >>> Holevo's theorem only half the information defining one's state can be >>> read.?? >> OK. But that is easily explained (and predicted) by classical digital >> mechanism. My first person is distributed on the infinitely many >> computations coming from a refinement of the computation on any possible >> details below my substitution level. So the ???parent matter??? available to >> a digital machine (in the arithmetical reality) will appear to be not >> duplicable. But ??? ah, I see you see the point below. >> >> >> >>> I agree that the brain processes instantiating thoughts that define our >>> memories and character are mostly classical and therefore can be read, >>> there will be, statistically, some variation between the original and a >>> copy and between two copies.???? >> Yes, but they don???t not endangered the personal identity. Like the >> Washington-guy and the Moscow-guy remains the same person as the Helsinki >> guy, despite differentiating a lot very quickly, especially after tasting >> the cup of coffee! >> >> >> >> >>> So it becomes a question of whether this variation is significant...not >>> whether it can be eliminated by going to "some level of substitution???. >> I am not sure I understand. By definition, the substitution level take into >> account all what is relevant. > > But definitions don't call the definidum into existence.??
Indeed. But I did not use a definition to claim any truth (of existence, or else). Mechanism assumes that you have a brain, that computer exists physically, that doctors exist, etc. It does not assume that the physical existence is primary, though, and eventually, the reasoning shows that the physical existence (which is never doubted) is not primary. > By definition God is omnipotent.?? By *some* definition. > But that doesn't mean there's an omnipotent being. On the contrary indeed. Nothing is omnipotent. Omnipotence and omniscience are two inconsistent notions, even when taken in isolation. I am not sure what was your point here Brent? Bruno > > Brent > >> If that needs all decimal of the real numbers used by a physical >> description, then Digital Mechanism is wrong, per definition, and we are out >> of the scope of my working hypothesis. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
