> On 3 May 2019, at 01:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2019 8:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 1 May 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/1/2019 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> I am not sure I understand. By definition, the substitution level take
>>>>>> into account all what is relevant.
>>>>> But definitions don't call the definidum into existence.??
>>>> Indeed. But I did not use a definition to claim any truth (of existence,
>>>> or else). Mechanism assumes that you have a brain, that computer exists
>>>> physically, that doctors exist, etc.
>>>>
>>>> It does not assume that the physical existence is primary, though, and
>>>> eventually, the reasoning shows that the physical existence (which is
>>>> never doubted) is not primary.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> By definition God is omnipotent.??
>>>> By *some* definition.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But that doesn't mean there's an omnipotent being.
>>>> On the contrary indeed. Nothing is omnipotent. Omnipotence and omniscience
>>>> are two inconsistent notions, even when taken in isolation.
>>>>
>>>> I am not sure what was your point here Brent?
>>>
>>> You wrote, "By definition, the substitution level take into account all
>>> what is relevant." My point is that Holevo's theorem entails that there is
>>> lower bound on the incompleteness of the substitution; so it is not at all
>>> clear that there is a substitution level that takes into account all that
>>> is relevant. Simply saying there is a definition of the term doesn't mean
>>> it refers.
>>
>> Yes, so Mechanism might implied that we (as abstract immaterial
>> computational object) are above the Holevo bound. Simply. But now, this is
>> incorrect. Even if we need to go below that bound, like if we have a quantum
>> brain, there is still a possibility that we don’t use the continuous
>> information related to it, so we will still be “reconstituted” in the
>> arithmetical reality, and the reversal physics/psychology-theology still
>> occurs.
>>
>> Mechanism would be false, if not only we are quantum machine, but some
>> infinite information is relevant, and if that infinite information is not
>> recoverable by the first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. In that case
>> mechanism is false, and materialism is against consistent (but not yet
>> necessarily true, note).
>
> There is nothing in Holevo's theorem that implies the information is
> infinite.
I agree, but it grows quickly by entanglement diffusion, even toward infinity
in an infinite physical universe.
> Only that it is unobtainable. Mechanism might still be true.
Yes, that is why a QC cannot violate Church’s thesis. But the non cloning is
still a consequence of mechanism, and the non cloning inferred from observation
is a confirmation of Mechanism.
> We don't know what detail is needed so that one "feels the same" after
> replacing part or all ones brain by some Turing machine. It might be be very
> little.
OK.
> One the other hand it might makes the fact that one has been duplicated
> obvious even if you still "felt" ("reported"?) you were the same person. So
> I'm not clear on why you think your duplication scenario is significant.
To understand that to make any prediction we need to take into account all our
“reconsistitutions” in the arithmetical reality. We cannot use on ontological
commitment (God or Universe) to select some computation. Or we need to say
“yes” to the doctor, and pray that God to intervene to make that selection, but
that is no more “mechanism”: it is usual invocation of a god (personal or non
personal). That is what the physicists do all the time, when they do a
prediction and verify it. With mechanism, the measure “one” (say) has to be
derived from the statistics on all first person experience supported by all
computations. That works well at the propositional level, thanks to the
Gödel-Löb-Solovay G*.
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
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